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COMMENT
PERSONAL FOUL: UNNECESSARY
RESTRICTION OF ENDORSEMENT AND
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR NCAA
STUDENT-ATHLETES
History shows that the NCAA is not going to do anything unless it's forced to.
Tom McMillen, former NCAA and NBA basketball player1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a talented athlete. In fact, you possess such talent that
you achieve Olympic status as a free-style moguls skier, from which you receive
substantial publicity and numerous endorsement opportunities Your
endorsements contribute largely to your ability to finance continued participation
in your Olympic sport.3 Additionally, you happen to be a strikingly attractive
individual, so much so that your services are sought to model a world-wide
recognized line of clothing.4 Also, you possess charisma that is coveted by a wildly
popular cable television station, enough to warrant a request for you to make a
guest appearance on one of its shows.' All the while, you harbor a desire to
1. Andrew Zimbalist, Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism and Conflict in Big-Time College
Sports 189 (Princeton U. Press 1999) (quoting Tom McMillen, former member of Congress and co-
chair of President's Council on Physical Fitness) (internal quotations omitted).
2. See text accompanying infra n. 12.
3. See Aff. of Andrew Carroll at 1 5, Bloom v. NCAA, 02 CV 1249 (Colo. 20th Dist. filed Aug. 13,
2002) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review). Carroll, CEO of a sports management and marketing
agency, also points out that "[u]nlike professional baseball, basketball, hockey, soccer or football,
professional skiing has no teams to pay the athletes salaries and bonuses, or to provide competition
equipment and all expenses." Id.
4. See text accompanying infra n. 12.
5. See Aff. of Conan Smith at 1 3, Bloom v. NCAA, 02 CV 1249 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 20th Dist. filed
July 23, 2002) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review). Smith, a veteran talent scout for William Morris
Agency in New York, recounts a conversation with Melissa Chusid, Nickelodeon's Talent and
Development Manager, during which Chusid "stated her belief that Jeremy had potential to excel in
television and films and that he was someone [the agency] should consider as a client." Id. Smith, who
currently represents, among other clients, "Ray Romano,... star of the... popular television series
Everybody Loves Raymond," later met with Bloom and concluded that football notwithstanding,
"Jeremy has the charisma and talent necessary to now secure gainful employment in the television and
film industry." Id. at 1 2.
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pursue yet another dream: to play college football for a university frequently
ranked among the top teams in the country.6
Unfortunately, while all the work you put into skiing generated recognition
that contributed to opportunities that would benefit you financially, your dream of
playing college football comes with a cumbersome string attached.7 According to
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) bylaws, you must forfeit all
promotional appearances, endorsement opportunities, and acting engagements if
you wish to pursue your dream to play college football.8
Such is the plight of Jeremy Bloom.9 Bloom is the rarest of athletes. The
world-class skier and college football recruit of the University of Colorado (CU)
chose to forego college football in 2001 and instead trained and competed in the
2002 Winter Olympics, placing ninth in the freestyle mogul competition.' ° Bloom
then emerged with a surprising victory at the United States Freestyle Nationals in
Boise, Idaho, in March 2002.11 Due to his success on the slopes and stunning good
looks, Bloom inked endorsement deals with Oakley, Dynastar, Tommy Hilfiger
apparel, and Under Armour ski wear.12
A Colorado state trial court denied Bloom's request for a temporary
restraining order which would have prohibited the Association from enforcing
bylaws that required him to forfeit acting, endorsement, and modeling
opportunities.13  In making its decision, the court in essence decided that the
NCAA has the right to create, enforce, and interpret its own bylaws. 4 If the court
6. See Off. College Sports Network, Inc, Record by Season <http://graphics.fansonly.com/photos/
schools/colo/sports/m-footblautopdf/17-1890-1959.pdf> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003) (displaying the
University of Colorado's history of football rankings). The University of Colorado finished the season
ranked in the top ten of both major polls in six of the last thirteen seasons and has achieved nine top-
twenty rankings during the same timeframe, winning a split national championship during the 1990-
1991 season. Id.
7. See generally NCAA, 2002-03 NCAA Division I Manual art. 12 (NCAA 2002).
8. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to P1.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 8-9, Bloom v.
NCAA, 02 CV 1249 (Colo. 20th Dist. filed July 30, 2002). The NCAA declares that "[t]here is not an
exception for student-athletes.., who may have dreams of stardom or who may possess 'star
qualities."' Id. at 9.
9. Bloom chose to play college football during the fall of 2002 and finished the season as the
nation's top-ranked freshman punt returner, averaging almost fifteen yards per return. NCAA, NCAA
Sports Statistics, NCAA Football Team and Individual Sports Statistics, National Rankings, IA National
Player Report Punt Returns <http://ncaa.org/stats/divisionl%20football/national%20rankings/lA-
playerpuntret.html> (accessed Jan. 21, 2004).
10. See B.G. Brooks, Bloom Sues for Right. to Play with Buffs <http://www.dailycamera.
com/bdc/buffzone/article/0,1713,BDC_2399_1289758,00.html> (accessed Sept. 4, 2002) (copy on file
with Tulsa Law Review).
11. Skimag.com, Bahrke, Bloom Win Mogul National Titles <http://www.skimag.com/skimag/
article/print/0,13435,325453,00.html> (accessed Sept. 7, 2003).
12. Brooks, supra n. 10 (discussing the endorsement work Bloom performed before enrolling at
CU, including stints for Tommy Hilfiger apparel, Dynastar skis, and Oakley); Goldman Bros., Under
Armour News: Under Armour Goes for the Gold... Again - Performance Apparel Supplier Strikes
Second Lucrative Olympic Deal <http://goldmanbros.com/under-armour/under-armour-news-
012102.asp> (accessed Jan. 21, 2004) (discussing Bloom's agreement to appear in print advertising for
the performance apparel manufacturer).
13. Bloom, slip op. at 8.
14. See id. at 7. In its decision, the court wavered: "As much as I would like to, I cannot substitute
my judgment for the judgment of the NCAA regarding the rule making and the administrative process
by which it seeks to achieve its objectives." Id.
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continues to give the NCAA deference in enacting and interpreting its own bylaws
in addition to the power to create them, the NCAA will have, in effect,
unrelenting power without any checks and balances to maintain the integrity of its
regulatory system.
This comment contends that the NCAA bylaws must be amended to allow
student-athletes to engage in endorsement and employment opportunities that
were secured for reasons unrelated to the collegiate athletic pursuit. Furthermore,
the restraints which prohibit Bloom from endorsement and employment
opportunities result from an arbitrary denial of his waiver request and a violation
of the antitrust laws. Part I of this paper discusses the history of the NCAA
bylaws and the prevalent theme of amateurism and eligibility considerations. Part
II discusses the NCAA's administrative process related to waivers and examines
its treatment of Bloom's case. Part III details how courts have interpreted NCAA
bylaws governing eligibility and amateurism. Part IV develops the background of
the Sherman Act and discusses how courts have applied it to the NCAA bylaws in
general, and more specifically how the court should apply antitrust law in Bloom's
case. Finally, Part V suggests amendments that should be made to the NCAA
bylaws to avoid future antitrust scrutiny and allow for an equitable outcome in
cases such as Bloom's.
II. NCAA BYLAWS
A. Historical Perspective
I do not agree... that you cannot control athletics. You can control them. Anything
that this organization decides to control in athletics you can control.
C.A. Richmond, President, Union College 15
The forerunner of the NCAA was born as the International Athletic
Association of the United States (IAAUS) on March 31, 1906, with a "birth
certificate" that would have listed higher education as its mother and football as
its father.1 6 Spurred by the dangers of football, a sport that at the time had neither
developed adequate safety equipment nor adapted its rules to prohibit dangerous
formations such as the "flying wedge" and "hurdle plays," several representatives
of universities that fielded football teams decided to take matters into their own
hands, since ."there was no authoritative body that could take the necessary action
[to make necessary changes to the rules]."' 7  Many of the rule changes
15. NCAA, The NCAA News, The NCAA Century Series - Part 1: 1900-1939 <http://ncaa.org/news/
1999/19991108/active/3623n30.html> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003) (quoting 1921 statement of C.A.
Richmond) (internal quotations omitted).
16. Kay Hawes, The NCAA News, The NCAA Century Series - Part I: 1900-1939, 'Its Object Shall
Be Regulation and Supervision': NCAA Born from Need to Bridge Football and Higher Education
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implemented by the committee nearly one hundred years ago are still intact
today.1
8
By its first convention in December 1906, the IAAUS had ratified its
constitution and bylaws, which included as its objective "the regulation and
supervision of college athletics throughout the United States, in order that the
athletic activities... may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the
dignity and purpose of higher education."' 9
Many of the issues discussed at the inaugural convention were amazingly
similar to concerns that consume the NCAA today, such as "academic
eligibility... [requirements, off season workout rules,] contest limitations...
amateurism and agents.",20 Ironically, both the NCAA and its precursor allowed
member schools a relative period of deregulation during its first thirty-four years
of existence. 1 In fact, the schools were left to police themselves regarding the
Association's bylaws, a concept referred to as "home rule.,22 Due to the limited
resources of the fledgling organization, each school was left to determine its own
rules for eligibility, in addition to the responsibility of assuming the role of arbiter
for any punishment that was to be levied for violation of the bylaws.23
By the end of World War I, the popularity of intercollegiate athletics had
24begun to increase, and the recruitment of athletes had become prevalent. While
many abuses occurred in recruiting and enforcing eligibility and amateurism
requirements, it was not until 1940 that the NCAA took the reigns of ownership
over investigation and enforcement of its bylaws, a power it has not relinquished
since.25 Impelled by the fear of contests fixed by professional gamblers,26 weary of
recruiting that had become national in scale due to the advent of commercial air
travel, 7 and eager to profit from postseason football bowl revenue, 2 the NCAA
adopted the "Sanity Code, 29 to provide a "declaration affirming sound principles
18. Id. Among the changes approved in 1906 were "approv[al of] the forward pass, prohibiti[on of]
hurdling and mass-momentum plays (by requiring at least six men on the offensive line), and increasing
first-down yardage to 10 yards." Id.
19. Id. (quoting art. 2 of the original constitution) (internal quotations omitted).
20. Hawes, supra n. 16.
21. See Gary T. Brown, The NCAA News, NCAA Answers Call to Reform: The 'Sanity Code' Leads
Association Down Path to Enforcement Program <http://ncaa.org/news/1999/19991122/active/3624n24.
html> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003); Hawes, supra n. 16.
22. Hawes, supra n. 16. Article 8 of the IAAUS constitution dictated that "[t]he Colleges and
Universities enrolled in this Association severally agree to take control of student athletic sports, as far
as may be necessary, to maintain in them a high standard of personal honor, eligibility and fair play,




26. See Brown, supra n. 21.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 23. The Sanity Code established, among other things, that "a student-
athlete could receive a tuition and fees scholarship (not room and board) if the student had a
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and practices ' for member institutions to follow. Detractors referred to the new
declaration as the "Purity Code," making light of what the media felt were
inequitable and unwarranted restrictions.3'
The Sanity Code provided only one option to punish violators: "expulsion
from the NCAA. 3 2 Understandably, many schools were reluctant to inflict such a
harsh punishment on a fellow institution, so much so that the NCAA was unable
to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary to expel the seven violators that had
been identified prior to the 1950 Convention.33
The Sanity Code was replaced in 1952 by a version sharply focused on
regulation, which included provisions not only for "the regulatory function but
also the enforcement arms necessary to uphold the rules. 3 4 It was in 1954 that the
Committee on Infractions was established, with most of its early years spent
30. Brown, supra n. 21 (quoting Wiles Hallock, former executive director of Pac-10 and Western
Athletic Conferences) (internal quotations omitted). E.K. Hall, chairman of the NCAA's Football
Rules Committee, is credited with championing the cause of the Sanity Code as early as 1931. Id.
After nine years of persuasion, "[tihe Association eventually heeded Hall's plea, taking on
investigative and judicial powers at the 1940 Convention when the Executive Committee was
authorized to probe alleged violations and issue interpretations." Id. The Sanity Code was finally
adopted by the NCAA Constitution in 1948. Id. The basic principles of the Code remain intact today,
even though enforcement of the provisions has taken on a life of its own. The Code listed as its tenets:
Principle of Amateurism. An amateur sportsman is one who engages in sports for the
physical, mental or social benefits he derives therefrom, and to whom the sport is an
avocation. Any college athlete who takes or is promised pay in any form for participation in
athletics does not meet this definition of an amateur.
Principle of Institutional Control and Responsibility. The control and responsibility for the
conduct of both intercollegiate and intramural athletics shall, in the last analysis, be
exercised by the institution itself.
Principle of Sound Academic Standards. Athletes shall be admitted to the institution on
the same basis as any other students and shall be required to observe and maintain the same
academic standards.
Principles Governing Financial Aids to Athletes. Financial aids in the form of scholarships,
fellowships or otherwise, even though originating from sources other than persons on whom
the recipient may be naturally or legally dependent for support, shall be permitted without
loss of eligibility [under certain conditions].
Principle Governing Recruiting. No member of an athletic staff or other official
representative of athletic interests shall solicit the attendance at his institution of any
prospective student with the offer of financial aid or equivalent inducements. This, however,
shall not be deemed to prohibit such staff member or other representative from giving
information regarding aids permissible under Section 4.
No member institution shall, directly or through its athletic staff members or by any other
means, pay the traveling expenses of any prospective student visiting its campus, nor shall it
arrange for or permit excessive entertainment of such prospective student during his visit
there.
No member institution shall, on its campus or elsewhere, conduct or have conducted in its
behalf any athletic practice session or test at which one or more prospective students reveal,
demonstrate, or display their abilities in any branch of sport.
Id.
31. Brown, supra n. 21.
32. Id.
33. Id. The seven alleged violators were apparently considered in toto, and the vote to expel was
111 for, ninety-three opposed. Id.
34. Id.
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resolving issues involving financial aid violations.35 Many southern schools
considered abandoning the NCAA during this time due to the restrictions
imposed on financial aid to student-athletes.36 Although much has changed in the
last fifty years, the fundamental structure of the NCAA remains intact today.
B. Financial Effects of NCAA Bylaws on the Student-Athlete
Some people think football is a matter of life and death. I don't like that attitude. I
can assure them it is much more serious than that.
Bill Shankly
37
The NCAA has long wielded its regulatory power over the student-athlete
population, buttressed largely by its tremendous financial resources.38 The typical
student-athlete has stood little chance of successfully contesting the validity of
restrictions imposed by the governing body of collegiate sports, which boasts $143
million in assets at last report.39 The NCAA states in its constitution that its basic
purpose is "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and,
by doing so, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics
and professional sports." 4
To say that the relationship between the NCAA and its student-athletes is
unconventional is an understatement. 41 Try to imagine another industry that has
more control over its workforce. The NCAA and its member institutions control,
among other things, the minimum number of credit hours in which a student must
be enrolled,42 awards and gifts that the athlete may receive,43 and with whom the
35. Brown, supra n. 21. While the Sanity Code enjoyed only a short stint as active legislation, its
long-term implications are evident in the changes that took place in the early 1950s, when a laissez faire
organization transformed into a regulated association that recognized the need for an enforcement arm
that would ensure a level playing field for its constituency. Id.
36. Id.
37. Quote Project, Sports <http://quoteproject.com/subject.asp?subject=66> (accessed Oct. 23,
2003) (quoting Bill Shankly) (internal quotations omitted). Although Mr. Shankly was referring to
British rugby, this sentiment could easily be attributed to many fans of American football.
38. See NCAA, NCAA Revenue Distribution, Budget and Finances, 2002-03 Budget
<http://www.ncaa.org/financial/2002-03_budget.pdf> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003). For the 2002-2003
operating year, the NCAA projected revenue of over $422 million. Id.
39. See e.g. Mike Fish, To Ski or Not to Ski? Olympian Bloom Preparing to Make Case to NCAA
<http://www.basketballdraft.com/inside-game/mike -fish/news/2002/03/19/fish-straightshooting-mailba
g/> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003) (likening Jeremy Bloom's legal battle to Curt Flood's fight against Major
League Baseball's reserve clause).
40. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 1.3.1,4.
41. See generally Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 15,
Bloom, 02 CV 1249. The NCAA refers to its relationship with student-athletes as "incidental," and
that its actual relations are with the member schools. Id.
42. NCAA, 2003-04 NCAA Division I Manual § 14.1.8.2, 130 (NCAA 2003) ("To be eligible for
competition, a student-athlete shall be enrolled in at least a minimum full-time program of studies
leading to a baccalaureate or equivalent degree as defined by the institution, which shall not be less
than 12 semester or quarter hours.").
43. See e.g. id. at § 16.1, 217-19.
6
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athlete may consult about professional opportunities." And until August 1, 2003,
a student-athlete was only permitted to earn a maximum of $2,000 from work
45performed during the school year.
Ironically, the executive staff of the NCAA is compensated at a level not
only in excess of the revenue-producing athletes, but also at higher levels than
those in comparable positions throughout corporate America.46 In contrast, a
student-athlete on a full scholarship for four years will receive the equivalent of
approximately $60,000 in aid towards educational expenses.47 At first glance, this
may appear to be a substantial sum for "playing a game." However, when one
considers the enormous time commitment made by the typical Division I athlete,
the amount of aid seems rather insignificant. Consider that many athletes either
practice or compete six days a week when their sport is in season.4s NCAA
regulations require one "day off" per week.49 Practices, weight training, therapy
for sports-related injuries, film study, travel, team meetings, and interviews often
necessitate fifty- to sixty-hour work weeks.50 Of course, this does not begin to
44. See NCAA, supra n. 42, at § 12.2.4.3, 75 ("An individual who retains an agent shall lose amateur
status."); see generally Matthews v. NCAA, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1215 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
45. Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 26. Effective August 1, 2003, a student-athlete may earn unlimited
income through employment, as long as the pay received is not due to the "value or utility that the
student-athlete may have for the employer because of the publicity, reputation, fame or personal
following that he or she has obtained because of athletics ability." NCAA, supra n. 42, at § 15.2.6(a),
199. The practical impact of this revision is hardly felt by the typical football or men's basketball
player, who has little if any time to devote to outside employment during the school year. See infra nn.
48-51 and accompanying text.
46. Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 182-84. The hypocrisy of the NCAA becomes apparent when
considering the perquisites received by the executives of the NCAA. Cedric Dempsey, executive
director of the NCAA, and his predecessor, Dick Schultz, have received hundreds of thousands of
dollars of additional benefits due to the association's numerous contractual relationships. Id. These
perks include all-expense-paid trips to the Winter Olympics, subsidized mortgages, kickbacks on group
insurance premiums, complimentary private jet usage, and trips to the finest resorts to discuss, of all
things, where to schedule the next corporate meeting. Id.
47. Caleb Langston, U. of Wyo., Dept. of Commun. & Journalism, Colleges Debate Whether to
Compensate Athletes <http://uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/cmjr/WILTSE/4100/Story3/caleb.htm> (accessed
Sept. 7, 2003) (noting value of full athletic scholarship for out-of-state resident at the University of
Wyoming).
48. Melissa Moore, Cavalier Daily, Student Athletes: All Work, Lots of Play <http://www.
cavalierdaily.com:2001/.Archives/1996/February/1/lfdone.asp> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003). According to
NCAA bylaws, the one day off guaranteed to student-athletes each week could end up being a travel
day to or from competition. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 17.1.5.4.1, 239.
49. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 17.1.5.4, 239. Of course, the NCAA throws this rule out the window
"during participation in one conference and postseason championship and any postseason certified
bowl games... and during participation in NCAA championships." Id.
50. While the thrust of this comment is that all student-athletes should retain pre-existing
endorsement and employment opportunities, the time commitments referred to are more attributable
to men's football and basketball. But see NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 17.1.5.1, 239. This rule limits
athletically related activities to twenty hours per week, which is laughable in sports such as college
football. The NCAA circumvents its own rule through yet another bylaw, which declares that any day
on which a competition is scheduled shall only count for three hours against the twenty hour
maximum. Id. at § 17.1.5.3.2, 221. A typical college football game day will require around eight hours
of a participant's time, starting with a scheduled team meal before the game and ending with post-
game interviews. Legendary programs such as Notre Dame even hold fantasy camps, which simulate
the game day experience. See Global Football, 2004 Notre Dame Football Fantasy Camp, Daily
Itinerary <http://www.ndfootballfantasycamp.com/itinerary.cfm> (accessed Feb. 1, 2004) (noting that
"gameday" activities begin at 8:30 in the morning and last until late in the afternoon. Ironically, the
actual game is abbreviated from its usual length in order to accommodate the rest of the activities.).
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account for their scholastic responsibilities. While the "seasons" for most sports
usually only encompass about five months of the year, mandatory off-season
workout programs usually fill the remaining school calendar.5 Additionally, most
52athletes participate in "optional" summer training programs. In essence, a
Division I athlete works all year to create the product that is marketed under the
NCAA brand. Figured conservatively, an athlete who spends thirty hours per
week on the sport is compensated by the NCAA member institution at a rate of
$9.62 per hour.53 The student-athlete is on a one-year contract, renewable for four
years,54 which will expire with no future benefits, no profit sharing, and no
opportunity for advancement during the four-year term. While this system of
compensation may seem inequitable, it only scratches the surface of the dilemma
that embroils Jeremy Bloom.
51. NCAA bylaw 17.11.6(a) sets a maximum of eight hours to be spent per week for out-of-season
practice.
52. These optional workout programs have come under fire recently due to the tragic death of
Rashidi Wheeler, a Northwestern University defensive back who collapsed during a summer workout.
See Associated Press, ESPN.com, College Football, School Seeks Independent Evaluation of Matter
<http://espn.go.com/ncf/news/2001/O803/1234992.html> (last updated Aug. 6, 2001). An anonymous
letter sent to a website developed by the deceased player's mother insists these workouts are anything
but voluntary. The letter stated:
Check out every "winning edge" workout during the off-season and you will see for yourself.
Lack of recovery time, insufficient water, and players falling to the ground. You can even
see it at the many so-called "voluntary" workouts that coaches can or supposedly cannot
participate. If you come you will see that coaches are within eyesight at any given activity.
Some were seen the day Rashidi died, they were running on the beach near by[sic]. They are
there to let their presence intimidate you.
Rashidiwheeler.org, Letters, Letter from an Anonymous Northwestern Student <http://www.
rashidiwheeler.org/letters/anonstudent2/anonstudent2.html> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003).
53. The calculation used to determine the hourly rate paid to an NCAA student-athlete is as
follows: the quotient derived from a $15,000 one-year scholarship, divided by 52 weeks, divided by
thirty hours per week. The Knight Commission proposed a three-pronged reform which was accepted
by the NCAA in 1991. Among its major emphases was to address time constraints on student-athletes.
Kay Hawes, NCAA News, A Presidential Era: Institutional CEOs Launch Reforms in College Athletics
<http://ncaa.org/news/1999/19991220/active/3626n25.html> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003). Proponent
Edward T. Foote, University of Miami (Florida) President, noted, "I've long believed one problem
we've needed to address is the excessive demands the system puts on a student-athlete's time." Id.
54. See High Sch. Baseball Web, Watch Out for Improper Recruiting <http://www.
hsbaseballweb.com/improper-recruiting.htm> (last updated Jan. 20, 2003).
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III. THE WAIVER REQUEST: BLOOM'S UNSUCCESSFUL
ATTEMPT TO USE THE NCAA'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
The NCAA rules are not the laws of the United States. They're simply a bunch of
hypocritical and unworkable rules set up by the NCAA. I would no sooner abide by
the rules and regulations of the NCAA than I would the Ku Klux Klan.
Mike Trope, former sports agent
55
A. NCAA Bylaws Affecting Bloom
The NCAA makes available to its member institutions an administrative
waiver system whereby student-athletes may apply for exemption from the
particular bylaws affecting them. This is precisely the course of action that Bloom
took. NCAA bylaws 12.4.1, 12.5.1.3, and 12.5.2.1 were the specific NCAA bylaws
that prevented Bloom from continuing his acting, modeling, and endorsement
opportunities while retaining eligibility to play football at CU. Accordingly,
Bloom sought a waiver to prevent such bylaws from applying to him.
NCAA bylaw 12.4.1 states in relevant part that compensation paid to
student-athletes "must be consistent with the limitations on financial aid set forth
in Bylaw 15. Compensation may be paid to a student-athlete: (a) Only for work
actually performed; and (b) At a rate commensurate with the going rate in that
locality for similar services., 56 NCAA bylaw 12.5.1.3 states:
If an individual accepts remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name or
picture to advertise or promote the sale or use of a commercial product or service
prior to enrollment in a member institution, continued remuneration for the use of
the individual's name or picture (under the same or similar circumstances) after
enrollment is permitted without jeopardizing his or her eligibility to participate in
intercollegiate athletics only if all of the following conditions apply:
(a) The individual's involvement in this type of activity was initiated prior to his or
her enrollment in a member institution;
(b) The individual became involved in such activities for reasons independent of
athletics ability;
(c) No reference is made in these activities to the individual's name or involvement
in intercollegiate athletics;
(d) The individual does not endorse the commercial product;
(e) Any compensation received by the individual is consistent with applicable
limitations on a student-athlete's maximum amount of financial aid; and
(f) The individual's remuneration under such circumstances is at a rate
commensurate with the individual's skills and experience as a model or
55. Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 25-26 (quoting Mike Trope) (internal quotations omitted).
56. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.4.1, 77.
2003]
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performer and is not based in any way upon the individual's athletics ability or
reputation.
57
NCAA bylaw 12.5.2.1 further dictates:
Subsequent to becoming a student-athlete, an individual [will be ineligible] for
participation in intercollegiate athletics if the individual:
(a) Accepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name or picture to
advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial
product or service of any kind, or
(b) Receives remuneration for endorsing a commercial product or service through
the individual's use of such product or service.
58
The NCAA considered Bloom's waiver request and subsequently denied it.
The details of the NCAA's improper consideration of the waiver are examined
below.
B. Factors Considered by the NCAA
The NCAA improperly reviewed Bloom's waiver request, resulting in an
arbitrary and capricious denial.59 To make things worse, the court reviewing the
temporary restraining order sought pursuant to the denial of the waiver request
also erroneously found that Bloom's request was, while meritorious, incapable of
enforcement. 6° Although the NCAA boasts that the five factors it considers in
determining waiver applications are in no particular order of importance,6'
apparently each is weighted differently.
First, the NCAA claimed that it contemplates all the information provided
by the student-athlete. 62 Bloom provided numerous affidavits from professionals
in the entertainment, broadcasting, and modeling arenas who all supported the
fact that his appeal in those areas had nothing to do with his competition in
football at CU.63 He initially declined scholarship funds so that he might be
57. Id. at § 12.5.1.3, 79.
58. Id. at § 12.5.2.1, 81.
59. See Verified Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 1 62, Bloom v. NCAA, 02 CV 1249
(Colo. 20th Dist. filed July 25, 2002) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review).
60. See Bloom, slip op. at 8.
61. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 10, Bloom, 02 CV
1249.
62 Id.
63. See e.g. Aff. of Conan Smith at 1 8, Bloom, 02 CV 1249; Aff. of Melissa Chusid at 1 6, Bloom v.
NCAA, 02 CV 1249 (not filed) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review). Interestingly, Chusid never
signed her affidavit, which comes as no surprise when considering that Viacom, Chusid's employer, not
only owns Nickelodeon, but also owns CBS, the NCAA's $1.7 billion corporate partner. See generally
Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 26; Viacom Intl., Inc., Viacom, The Facts <http://www.viacom.com/thefacts.tin>
(accessed Jan. 30, 2004). While attempting to get Chusid's signature on the affidavit, Peter Rush,
Bloom's attorney, and Chusid exchanged numerous emails. During one such exchange, Chusid was
asked to verify the accuracy of the affidavit. Ms. Chusid then reviewed the affidavit and verified its
content, except for an inaccurate reference to the name of a movie. The inference can be drawn from
that exchange that although Chusid never signed the affidavit, the content of the affidavit is
nonetheless accurate. Specifically, Chusid's "assessment that Jeremy Bloom has star quality has
nothing to do with whatever football or athletic skill Jeremy Bloom may or may not have. Instead,
[Chusid's] assessment is based solely upon his on-camera talent. [Nickelodeon] wanted Jeremy Bloom
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allowed to accept compensation, since CU would be providing no additional
benefits to him over and above what other non-student-athletes were receiving, all
of whom are unrestricted in pursuing employment opportunities while enrolled in
college. 64 Had the NCAA considered all information provided ,by Bloom, this
factor should have weighed heavily in his favor.
The next factor, which also should have been favorable to Bloom, is "the
welfare of the student athlete involved., 65 Financially speaking, there is no valid
argument that Bloom would be better served by excluding him from endorsement,
promotional, and broadcasting opportunities. The NCAA, however, voices its
concern that its duty to protect student-athletes from exploitation calls it to
prohibit such activities.66 The NCAA's purported concern is suspect at best,
especially when considering the litany of instances where it allows such intrusions
into a student-athlete's life when the benefit flows directly to the NCAA aid its
member schools. 67  While appearing off-campus to shoot an episode for a
Nickelodeon series is considered impermissible exploitation, NCAA bylaw
12.5.3(a) allows Bloom to perform "unlimited" interviews as related to CU
football, for which he receives no compensation. 68
Of course, while financial concerns are paramount in Bloom's case, there is
also the much more rampant exploitation of the average student-athlete's time.69
Additionally, athletes today are encouraged to participate in televised post-game
celebrations during which merchandise sporting the logo of the official NCAA
licensee is adorned (usually on hats or t-shirts), 70 not to mention post-season bowl
games, which often consume much of the traditional holiday break between the
fall and spring semesters. 7' The following statement by John Cavanaugh, Vice
President of Notre Dame in 1941-which appears in a letter written to the Sugar
Bowl Committee-provides a glimpse of how those responsible for caring for the
well being of student-athletes used to treat such matters:
A postseason game draws the football season out over alarge part of the regular
academic year [and after the] strenuous... regular schedule [the players must focus
on their studies.] But much as we need money and could use it here, it does not
to work on [its] show because of his talent [as an on-camera personality]." Aff. of Melissa Chusid at
6, Bloom, 02 CV 1249; see email from Melissa Chusid, Manager of Casting, Nickelodeon & The Natl.
Network, to Peter Rush, atty., RE: Draft Statement (July 17, 2002) (copy on file with Tulsa Law
Review).
64. See Verified Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 17, Bloom, 02 CV 1249.
65. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 10, Bloom, 02 CV
1249.
66. See NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 2.9, 5 ("[S]tudent-athletes should be protected from exploitation by
professional and commercial enterprises.").
67. See e.g. id. at § 12.5.3(a), 81-82; supra nn. 48-51 and accompanying text.
68. See NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.5.3(a), 81-82.
69. See text accompanying supra nn. 48-52.
70. Pl.'s Opening.Br. at 7,11-12, Bloom v. NCAA, 02 CA 2302 (Colo. App. filed July 2, 2003) (copy
on file with Tulsa Law Review).
71. See generally 2003-04 Bowl Schedule <http://www.suntimes.com/special-sections/holiday/
holiday-bowlsked.html> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004) (noting that of the twenty-eight bowl games played
during the 2003-2004 season, only five were scheduled prior to Christmas day, and the remainder
extended from Christmas until January 4).
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seem to us best for the boys [on the football team] and for the University to try to
procure it in such a way. So far as we can see, a postseason game would be played at
the sacrifice of many values, physical and academic, which properly belong to the
students participating in football.
72
Unfortunately, the Cavanaughs of the world are not vocal within the specter
of Division I football today. The only bowl invitations that go unaccepted in
today's climate are those offered for "minor bowls" that offer little hope of
attracting enough alumni to travel to the destination to make it a profitable
venture for the athletic department.73  The welfare of the student-athlete is
relegated to the back seat since it now rides the same bus as corporate
sponsorships, licensing partnerships, and television contracts.
A third factor weighed by the NCAA is "any possible competitive or
recruiting advantages, 74 that might be gained by the member school if the
applicable waiver is granted. It is difficult to envision an advantage that CU
would gain in this instance, since the chances that another athlete with similar
skills will surface in the near future is infinitesimally small. The court hearing the
temporary restraining order also conceded this fact, stating:
This is an exceptionally unique case that is virtually certain to never occur again.
Today Mr. Bloom stands alone when compared to the other more than 350,000
student athletes. Entities can respond to unique circumstances as the NCAA has or
can see such a situation as a unique opportunity to take a positive, proactive student
athlete friendly approach and still not undermine a primary and laudable objective
relating to amateurism. Here the NCAA had an opportunity to recognize and
72. Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 90 (quoting letter written by John Cavanaugh, Notre Dame University
Vice President, to Sugar Bowl Committee, 1941) (internal quotations omitted). Many attitudes toward
post-season play have changed. The virtue of academic focus and the necessity of rest for weary
warriors has been replaced by conference championship games during final examination periods,
thirteen-game regular season football schedules, and post-season competition which extends until the
end of January, thus overlapping the college basketball season by nearly three months. Some believe
that the football season is destined to become even longer. With the possibility of an additional $1
million revenue for each Division I school participating in football, the question likely becomes not if,
but when. See id. at 109.
73. Tom Weir & Thomas O'Toole, USA Today, Bowl Invitations For Sale <http://www.usatoday.
com/sports/college/football/2001-12-05-bowl-focus.htm> (accessed Oct. 23, 2003). In 2001, UCLA
Athletic Director Pete Dalis estimated that had the Bruins accepted a bid to play in the 2001
Humanitarian Bowl in frigid Boise, Idaho, the tradition-rich Pac-10 school would have lost an
estimated $300,000. Id.; but see ESPN.com, College Football, Replacement May Be Sought outside C-
USA <http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=1674891> (last updated Dec. 1, 2003) (reporting
that TCU declined an invitation to play in the GMAC Bowl because the "game conflicted with the
school's exams schedule"). TCU opted to play in its own backyard, in the Forth Worth Bowl, on
December 23 rather than play in the GMAC Bowl, citing academic reasons. Skeptics point to the fact
that the Horned Frogs played four games on weekdays during the season, casting doubt that TCU's
stance to refuse the GMAC bid was academically motivated. Stephen Hawkins, No Exam Conflicts,
No Travel Worries: TCU Bowling at Home <http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/APStories/
stories/D7V6IPAOl.html> (accessed Jan. 30, 2004). Suspiciously, the payout for the Fort Worth Bowl
was $800,000 per team, compared with $750,000 for the GMAC. And when considering the expenses
eliminated from declining a trip to Mobile, Alabama, the TCU coffers were undoubtedly benefited by
the substituted Fort Worth Bowl. See Sports Fans of Am. Assn., 2003/2004 College Football Bowl
Games <http://www.sportsfansofamerica.com/Links/Football/College/Bowls/2003.htm> (accessed Feb.
1, 2004).
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support a world cup champion and an Olympic competitor by supporting his future
success-by leaving doors open rather than closing them. A thoughtful and
narrowly constructed waiver based upon the unique circumstances of this case could
have been granted. Such a waiver would have been a recognition by the NCAA
that: Mr. Bloom is truly an amateur athlete in football with only dreams of...
receiving playing time, and that his potential arises not from his football ability, but
arises from the circumstances relating to obvious talent unrelated to his athleticism.
I think that the NCAA is missing an opportunity to promote amateurism on the one
hand, and the opportunity to support the personal and football [and] non-athletic
growth of a student athlete on the other.
75
In addition, the court's apologetic approach in its decision speaks volumes
regarding the public sentiment towards Bloom. Yet the court still relied on cases
that have little factual similarity to devise a ruling on a matter that it admits is
without any parallel from which to draw guidance.76 The only advantage that CU
had over most schools in the recruitment of Bloom was its geographic proximity to
numerous ski resorts, where Bloom can practice his chosen profession.77
The NCAA relied heavily on the two remaining factors in denying Bloom's
waiver requests: the intent of the applicable bylaw and case precedent arising in
similar situations.78 The court cited NCAA v. Lasege 9 and Cole v. NCAA8° as
persuasive authority and concluded that it could not find that the NCAA
administrative review process was not "at least minimally substantively rational
and procedurally fair."81 The court also relied on the holding in Pinsker v. Pacific
Coast Society of Orthodontists82 in establishing that the NCAA's actions were in
compliance with the minimum standards required.83  Conspicuously, the court
failed to analyze the test set forth in Pinsker to determine whether an alleged
action falls under the "arbitrary and capricious" umbrella. 84 Pinsker held that a
"decision to exclude or expel an individual may be 'arbitrary' either because the
reason for the exclusion or expulsion is itself irrational or because, in applying a
given rule in a particular case, the [governing body] has proceeded in an unfair
manner."85 The court in Bloom completely overlooked this important guidance
86
which, in effect, supplies the trier of fact the autonomy to consider individual
75. Bloom, slip op. at 7.
76. See id.
77. No less than twenty-seven ski resorts dot the state of Colorado, many of which are within a few
hours of CU's campus. See Ski Colorado <http://skicolorado.com> (accessed Aug. 31, 2003).
78. See Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to PI.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 10, Bloom, 02
CV 1249.
79. 53 S.W.3d 77 (Ky. 2001).
80. 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Ga. 2000), affd, 235 F.3d 1346 (lth Cir. 2000).
81. Bloom, slip op. at 6-7. The court's decision to speak in double negatives-"I cannot find that
the.., process was not... fair"-rather than expressly concluding that the process was fair is curious.
See id.
82. 526 P.2d 253 (Cal. 1974).
83. Bloom, slip op. at 6-7.
84. See Pinsker, 526 P.2d at 256.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. See Bloom, slip op. at 6-7.
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circumstances in applying an administrative rule. When application of the rule
would lead to an unfair result, the court should impede its imposition. Had the
court in Bloom applied its rationale to the language in Pinsker, Bloom would have
been allowed to benefit from his modeling, acting, and endorsement opportunities
without interruption.87
IV. THE COURT'S HOLDING THAT THE NCAA HAS A
RIGHT TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR ELIGIBILITY
Under existing conditions, promising young athletes in high schools.., are
rounded up by alumni scouts or other agencies, they receive inducements of one sort
or another, in many cases legitimate and in many other cases such as to prostitute all
moral integrity. But whether right or wrong, the athlete is zealously sought after, and
that because he is an athlete.
If possible, he is placed under obligations before reaching college.... He thus
enters college with the wrong idea of the relative importance of sport and study. Once




A. Purpose of NCAA Amateurism Bylaws
The NCAA bylaws state, "Only an amateur student-athlete is eligible for
intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport., 89 The purpose of the
NCAA bylaws in maintaining amateurism is to "maintain[] a clear line of
demarcation between college athletics and professional sports." 9  The means
through which the NCAA has enforced the demarcation has served to prevent
student-athletes from accepting compensation for certain employment and
endorsement opportunities. The NCAA bases its stance on what it refers to as the
"Principle of Amateurism," 91 which insists that student-athletes should be guided
in their pursuit of intercollegiate athletics by motivational factors such as the
87. Off. College Sports Network, Inc., CollegeSports.com, Jeremy Bloom Signs Ad Deal
<http://www.collegesports.com/sports/m-footbl/stories/020304aam.html> (Feb. 3, 2004). Although
Bloom desisted from accepting endorsement income once he enrolled at CU, he recently announced
his intention to resume such activities. Bloom signed a deal with Equinox Fitness Clubs-his first
plunge into compensation-related endorsements while competing at CU-which plans to feature him
on billboards in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, as well as in popular magazines. While the
move is likely to draw the ire of the NCAA, Bloom insists that he "will not willingly leave .college
football," and that "[i]f the NCAA truly cares about student-athletes, then there is no reason why they
should attempt to stand in [his] way of winning a gold medal for-[the United States].... If they don't
[care], they will have to kick [him] out." Id. (quoting Jeremy Bloom) (internal quotations omitted).
88. NCAA, NCAA News, The NCAA Century Series - Part I: 1900-39, Thoughts of the Day
<http://ncaa.org/news/1999/19991108/active/3623n30.html> (accessed Jan. 2, 2004) (quoting C.W.
Savage, professor, Otterbein College, 1914) (internal quotations omitted).
89. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.01.1, 69 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at § 12.01.2, 69.
91. Id. at § 2.9, 5.
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education al, physical, and social benefits achieved through competition, while the
NCAA serves as protector from the dangers of commercial exploitation. 92
B. Exceptional Student-Athletes Receive Undue Scrutiny under Existing NCAA
Amateurism Bylaws
Similar to Bloom, Darnell Autry, the star running back on Northwestern's
historic Rose Bowl team,. excelled as a drama major off the field.93 Due to his
talent in his chosen field of study, he was invited to perform in a movie filmed
during the summer of 1996 in Rome, Italy.94 While any "normal" college student
would jump at the opportunity to work a summer job related to his course of
study, Autry consulted the NCAA, just to make sure that it would be officially
permitted for him to do so.95 The NCAA ruled that his participation would
violate the then existing bylaw "that one cannot be an amateur qualified to play in
intercollegiate competition and still receive remuneration in any activity
connected to one's sport. 9 6 Therefore, Autry was forced to get a temporary
restraining order so he could accept the role.97 However, he still was not allowed
to accept payment for his part in the movie; only his expenses were covered.98
While the NCAA amended the rule the following year so that subsequent student-
athletes could participate in such roles, it retained the stance that compensation
could not be accepted for such work.99
Autry's case is illustrative of the quandary facing Bloom today. While Autry
was able to get the NCAA to modify its position ever so slightly, he had to seek
legal assistance to do so.t°° Legal battles, especially those involving the NCAA,
tend to take months and even years to resolve.1 ' With a window of only four or
five years in which to compete as student-athletes, 1° 2 many would rather focus on
their chosen sport than ensnare themselves in an attempt to change legislation that
may or may not affect their careers. Those who litigate tend to be athletes who
92. Id.
93. See Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 17.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The NCAA initially determined that Autry would not have been offered the role had it not
been for his football prowess.
97. Id.
98. Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 17 (sarcastically noting the NCAA's "flexibility" in allowing a student-
athlete to pursue summer work that relates to a chosen field of study as long as no payment is
accepted).
99. Id.
100. Autry was represented by Peter Rush, the same attorney who represents Bloom. Telephone
interview with Peter Rush (Sept. 10, 2002).
101. See e.g. Las Vegas Rev. J., Tarkanian, NCAA Reach Settlement <http://www.lvrj.com/lvrL home/
1998/Apr-01-Wed-1998/news/7236825.html> (accessed Oct. 20, 2003). The NCAA stalled the litigation
for over seven years through numerous motions and appeals, including a change of venue request that
it pursued all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. Las Vegas Rev. J., Jerry Tarkanian and the NCAA:
Chronology of Events <http://home.att.net/-rebelsO2/page2lb-tarkncaa.html> (accessed Oct. 20, 2003).
102. Student-athletes are allowed five years to play their chosen sport as long as they refrain from
participating against outside competition during one of those years. NCAA, Frequently Asked
Questions on Redshirts, Age Limits and Graduate Participation <http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/
membership-svcs/eligibility-recruiting/faqs/eligibility-seasons.html> (accessed Oct. 20. 2003).
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have been declared ineligible and are seeking reinstatement, 10 3 not athletes
already eligible who simply want inequitable bylaws reformed.
Bloom's case is unique in that his legal issue was discovered before he ever
set foot on the University of Colorado's campus as a student." 4 Even if it takes
another year to resolve the question of whether he can accept endorsement
compensation, which resulted from activities engaged in prior to his admission at
Colorado, any such rule changes would still benefit him for his final year of
eligibility.
Bloom attempted to take Autry's minimal victory a step further by forcing
the NCAA to allow compensation for employment gained by means unrelated to
participation in an NCAA-sponsored sport. Bloom first sought declaratory and
injunctive relief in a complaint filed July 25, 2002, in state court in Colorado.0 5 In
his complaint, Bloom claimed that "[an actual controversy exists between the
NCAA and [Bloom] concerning the application of NCAA Bylaws 12.4.1, 12.5.1.3,
[and] 12.5.2.1 ... to the preexisting opportunities open to [Bloom]."' 6
103. See e.g. Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1976); Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060; Ganden v.
NCAA, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1996); Matthews v. NCAA, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199
(E.D. Wash. 1999); Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77; Hart v. NCAA, 550 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 2001).
104. Verified Mot. for T.R.O. & Prelim. Inj. at 2, Bloom v. NCAA, 02 CV 1249 (Colo. 20th Dist. filed
July 25, 2002).
105. Verified Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at J 65, Bloom, 02 CV 1249.
106. Id. at 1 59. The relevant NCAA bylaws state:
Criteria Governing Compensation to Student-Athletes. All compensation received by a
student-athlete must be consistent with the limitations on financial aid set forth in Bylaw 15.
Compensation may be paid to a student-athlete:
(a) Only for work actually performed; and
(b) At a rate commensurate with the going rate in that locality for similar services;
NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.4.1, 77.
Advertisements and Promotions Subsequent to Enrollment. Subsequent to becoming a
student-athlete, an individual shall not be eligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics
if the individual:
(a) Accepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name or picture to
advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial product or
service of any kind, or
(b) Receives remuneration for endorsing a commercial product or service through the
individual's use of such product or service.
NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.5.2.1, 81.
Appearance in Commercial Films. Footage of an institution's intercollegiate game or event
or of the individual performance of a student-athlete may not be used in a commercial movie
unless all individuals appearing in the footage have exhausted their seasons of eligibility.
NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.5.2.3.4, 81.
[Media Activities] During the Playing Season. During the playing season, a student-athlete
may appear on local radio and television programs (e.g., coaches shows) or engage in writing
projects when the student-athlete's appearance or participation is related in any way to
athletics ability or prestige, provided the student-athlete does not receive any remuneration
for the appearance or participation in the activity. The student-athlete shall not make any
endorsement, expressed or implied, of any commercial product or service. The student-
athlete may, however, receive legitimate and normal expenses directly related to the
appearance or participation in the activity, provided it occurs within a 30-mile radius of the
institution's main campus. The institution also may provide such expenses for a student-
athlete to appear on radio or television in the general locale of an institution's away-from-
home competition.
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Bloom further contended that he was a third-party beneficiary to the
contract between the NCAA and CU, a contention with which the court agreed.' °7
Bloom prayed for the court to determine that the NCAA should be "permanently
enjoined from interpreting [the] Bylaws... in such a way as to preclude ... Bloom
from fulfilling and pursuing the pre-collegiate and pre-NCAA occupations [then]
available to him in skiing, acting and modeling."' 8 Bloom also asked the court to
enjoin the NCAA from affecting his football eligibility because of his various
activities related to skiing or because he filed the litigation.109 Finally, Bloom was
courteous enough to plead on behalf of CU that the NCAA be prohibited from
penalizing CU's status "as a consequence of his acting, skiing or modeling work or
the filing of this litigation.""0
C. Key Cases Involving Eligibility and Amateurism Considerations
The NCAA defended its position to establish eligibility criteria for its
student-athletes on a long line of cases, none of which encompassed facts similar
to those present in Bloom."' Cole dealt with the NCAA's ability to impose
academic admissions procedures on its student-athletes." Cole involved a
"partial qualifier," one who is ineligible to compete during the first year of
enrollment at an NCAA institution due to failure to achieve the minimum high
school grade point average and SAT or ACT score.1 3 Cole unsuccessfully
attempted to utilize the NCAA's waiver process to gain full eligibility his
freshman year due to a preexisting learning disability first discovered when he was
in second grade. 4 After the NCAA denied his waiver request due to insufficient
information upon which to grant the waiver, Cole sued.' 5 However, the court
found that the student-athlete's claim was moot because his freshman year had
ended, and therefore he was no longer considered a partial qualifier.1
1 6
Undoubtedly, the NCAA has the discretion to impose academic
requirements upon those attending its member institutions, but to suggest that
academic standards parallel those relating to amateurism is unfounded.
Amateurism is a distinctive qualification requirement of NCAA student-athletes,
since all students must adhere to at least some level of academic performance in
NCAA, supra n. 7, at art. 12, § 12.5.3(a), 81.
107. Bloom, slip op. at 2.
108. Verified Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at T 65, Bloom, 02 CV 1249.
109. Id. at 12-13.
110. Id.
111. See Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 11-12, Bloom,
02 CV 1249.
112. 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1070-71.
113. See id. at 1067. A partial qualifier has the option to "pay his own way" during his freshman
year, which would preserve four years of eligibility to compete. See generally NCAA, supra n. 7, at §
14.3.2, 142-43.
114. Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.
115. Id. at 1066.
116. id. at 1067-69.
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order to enroll and maintain academic standing in a college or university."7 Cole
is also distinguishable due to the fact that the waiver request sought in Cole is far
more commonplace11 8 than the rare instance brought by Bloom.11 9 If the NCAA is
truly concerned about defending its legislation, Cole is a much bigger fish than
Bloom could ever become.
Lasege involved a basketball player who attempted to retain NCAA
eligibility after he signed a contract overseas to play professional basketball.
120
The student-athlete also accepted plane tickets, lodging, meals, and numerous
other benefits, including a personal cook and driver. 12' The NCAA found that
Lasege had demonstrated a "clear intent to professionalize' ' 122 and therefore
denied his waiver request. 23 Lasege is clearly inapposite to this case since Bloom
is not seeking to compete on the ski team at CU, nor has he signed a professional
contract to play football. It is important to note that Lasege also recognized that
"[w]hile courts ordinarily refrain from reviewing decisions of unincorporated
private associations [and instead defer to the association's best judgment], if the
organization acts inconsistently with its own rules, its action may be sufficiently
arbitrary to invite judicial review."' 24
Hart v. NCAA,' 2' another case upon which the NCAA relies, 26 involved a
wrestler who sought an additional year of eligibility when he was precluded from
competition due in part to an emergency resolution adopted by the NCAA to
protect the safety of its student-athlete wrestlers.12 The university for which he
competed had recruited another wrestler to compete in the weight division
occupied by Hart, with a plan to have Hart lose weight to compete in a lower
weight class.' 28 Although Hart was the only wrestler out of five from his school
who was unsuccessful in obtaining a waiver to compete in a lower weight class, the
court nevertheless found that participation in interscholastic athletics, alone, is not
a protected right. 129 It is important to differentiate this situation from Bloom's, in
that Bloom's involves not only participation, but also pre-existing financial
opportunities. The court in Hart alludes to a scenario in which a participation
117. See e.g. Regents of U. of Colo., Prospective Student Center, Freshman Student Admission,
Admission Requirements, Guaranteed Admission for Colorado Freshmen <http://www.colorado.edu/
prospective/freshman/requirements/guarantee.html> (accessed Oct. 20, 2003).
118. See e.g. Matthews, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1202, 1204-05.
119. See supra n. 75 and accompanying text.
120. 53 S.W.3d at 80.
121. Id. at 81.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 83 n. 9 (quoting 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations and Clubs § 28) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
125. 550 S.E.2d 79.
126. See Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 12, Bloom, 02
CV 1249.
127. 550 S.E.2d at 82-83.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 85.
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right could be enforced if it coincides with an educational interest. 30 Bloom could
easily argue that his educational interest related to communications is negatively
impacted by his inability to perform on Nickelodeon due to NCAA restraints.13 1
Additionally, in matters regarding the physical well being of student-athletes, the
NCAA has had and should continue to be shown the highest level of deference to
implement appropriate measures to ensure their protection. 32 The NCAA's
suggestion that the rationale in Hart is similar to that which should be used in this
case is a ludicrous proposition, since endorsement revenue and the life of a
student-athlete are clearly dissimilar issues.
Finally, the NCAA cites Ganden v. NCAA 33 as persuasive authority that
member institutions may impose "reasoned conditions" upon eligibility.'
34
Ganden held that a swimmer who was ruled a partial qualifier due to his low high
school grade point average had no cause of action even though Ganden
challenged the NCAA's eligibility requirements under Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). 135 Again, Bloom's legal argument has nothing to do
with the NCAA's authority to set academic standards for admission. The inability
of the NCAA to produce cases which address similar circumstances to those in
Bloom's case point both to the uniqueness of his situation and the NCAA's lack of
legal authority to support its defense.
D. Bloom: An Unprecedented Case
There are several problems with the court's holding in Bloom. First, the
court erroneously compared the relationship between most student-athletes and
the NCAA to Bloom's relationship with the NCAA, which distorted its view of
the intent of the applicable bylaw. 3 6  CU was in no way "exchanging" an
education with Bloom for his adherence to terms of the student-athlete
agreement,'137 because he had not yet accepted financial assistance in the form of a
130. Id. at 86.
131. Verified Mot. for T.R.O. & Prelim. Inj. at 3-5, Bloom, 02 CV 1249 (Colo. 20th Dist. filed July
25, 2002). The Assistant Dean of CU's Journalism and Mass Media Schools stressed the importance to
Bloom of gaining work-related experience while in school in order to separate himself from others in
both the program at CU and the workforce in general once he graduates. In fact, Jones went so far to
say that "[t]he profession will hire the recent graduate with experience over other graduates every
time ...... Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
132. See Hawes, supra n. 16, at 2-3. Safety of student-athletes has always been a primary concern of
the NCAA. In fact, the precursor to the NCAA, the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United
States (IAAUS), was formed at the insistence of Theodore Roosevelt, who, after "[t]he 1905 college
football season[, during which] ... 18 [competitors] d[ied] and 149 [were] serious[ly] injur[ed]," met
with leaders from "Harvard, Yale and Princeton.. . [and delivered the message to] "[r]eform the game
or it will be outlawed," even if it meant taking executive action to do so. Id. Ironically, even the
NCAA's initial formation was prodded by the threat of presidential intervention. Id. at 3.
133. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1996).
134. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to PI.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 12, Bloom, 02 CV
1249.
135. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17368 at *1.
136. Bloom, slip op. at 2.
137. See id. at 2-3.
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scholarship or otherwise from CU. 3 ' He was a resident of the State of Colorado
who was attending a state school, so any exchange involved would have been a
separate contract independent of any dealing with the NCAA, just as any other
non-scholarship student would have with the university to which tuition was paid.
It was a contractual relationship between CU and Bloom only. The only quid pro
quo between Bloom and the NCAA was Bloom's opportunity to play college
football in exchange for abidance to the NCAA rules.139  Bloom could have
actually argued that CU gained from the publicity that Bloom drew (and
continues to draw) to the school while he received nothing in return. 40
Bloom therefore is entitled to injunctive relief for exactly the reason that the
NCAA attempts to convince the court that relief is not warranted: "because 'a
mandatory injunction prescribes conduct that has not been defined by contract,
and instead requires the court to choose a mode of performance from a wide
range of possibilities."1 41 While it may necessitate an extreme circumstance to
involve judicial determination of a specific remedy, the NCAA's own iron-clad
bylaws are themselves to blame for such a requirement. Snyder v. Sullivan,142
upon which the NCAA relied, involved the sale of a business between two
businessmen, who were free to contract in any way they saw fit. 143 Conversely,
Bloom had no options to amend or draft contract proposals when signing the
NCAA student-athlete agreement.
The NCAA also misinterpreted the Colorado Supreme Court's holding in
Snyder regarding the "essential purpose" of a mandatory injunction, which "is to
preserve the status quo and prevent injury."' 44 The NCAA incorrectly assumed
that the status quo referred to in Snyder is the state of its own bylaws before the
145request for injunctive relief was sought, when a careful reading of the decision
undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that the status quo in this case is the position
Bloom was in prior to the date NCAA's restrictions were placed upon him, when
he was free to enter ski-related endorsement contracts, acting engagements, and
modeling appearances.
The NCAA further complained that if Bloom's relief were granted, it would
be required to draft a new Division I Manual,' 46 when all that would be necessary
138. Verified Compl. for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 17, Bloom, 02 CV 1249.
139. See Bloom, slip op. at 2.
140. See generally Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 169. In a similar attention-drawing scenario on a macro
scale, it is estimated that the College of Charleston's trip to the NCAA basketball tournament in 1997
accounted for an immediate increase in admissions inquiries and a marketing benefit estimated at $3
million. Keith F. West, Charleston Regional Business Journal, C of C Arena Decision Raises New
Questions <http://www.charlestonbusiness.com/issues/6_5/news/2484-1.html> (Mar. 10, 2003).
141. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 13, Bloom, 02 CV
1249 (quoting Snyder v. Sullivan, 705 P.2d 510, 514 n. 5 (Colo. 1985) (en banc)).
142. 705 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
143. Seeid. at511.
144. Id. at 514 n. 5 (emphasis added).
145. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 13-14, Bloom, 02
CV 1249.
146. Id. at 13-14.
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are a few minor revisions to allow the Blooms of the world to showcase all of their
given ability.'47
The court then analyzed the six factors espoused in Rathke v. MacFarlane'
and determined that Bloom was not entitled to injunctive relief.149 The factors
considered were:
1. a reasonable probability of success on the merits,
2. a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury which may be prevented
by injunctive relief,
3. that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law,
4. that the granting of a preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest,
5. that the balance of equities favors the injunction, and
6. that the injunction will preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits.' 50
Bloom satisfied. three of the requirements, proving a "danger of real,
immediate and irreparable injury,"'' the non-existence of "an adequate legal
remedy,"' 15 2 adri, firally,' that "the injunction would preserve the status quo prior to
a trial on the merits.', 53 However, the court determined that Bloom had not
proven "a reasonable probability that [he would] succeed on the merits,' 54 that
"the public interest would be served by the injunction, '  or that the weight of all
equities considered would favor an injunction. 56
In its determination that Bloom did not prove that he would likely succeed
on the merits, the court points to the "professional baseball exception" as a
demonstration why Bloom's claim would likely fail. 57 The court correctly points
out that the customary compensation for a professional baseball player is a salary
and signing bonus, both of which are permissible under NCAA regulations for a
student-athlete who plays a different sport-usually football-in college. 5 8
147. Article 12 of the NCAA Constitution, which addresses amateurism, lists no less than thirty-one
amendments or revisions which have been made to the document in the last ten years. Most changes
have taken place in the last five years, which indicates that the task of revision may not be as
burdensome as the NCAA would have the court in Bloom believe. See NCAA, supra n. 7, at art. 12,
69-83. What is far more burdensome than publishing a new manual, which the NCAA does every year
regardless of the number of changes from the previous year, is the process that Bloom and those
similarly situated would have to endure to get proposed legislation passed. See infra nn. 257-69 and
accompanying text.
148. 648 P.2d 648, 653-54 (Colo. 1982).
149. Bloom, slip op. at 3-8.
150. Rathke, 648 P.2d at 653-54.




155. Id. at 8.
156. Bloom, slip op. at 8.
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Incongruently, the NCAA prohibits a large part of the customary earnings paid to
a professional skier, that is, endorsement and promotion income.59 The court
shows the NCAA deference in determining that income customary to a particular
sport still falls outside the ambit of salary, and is thus prohibited by the NCAA.
Therefore, any athlete who happens to compete professionally in a sport that is
largely compensated through endorsement income and appearance fees will enjoy
none of the financial benefit of one who happens to compete in another sport that
compensates its athletes primarily through salary. The NCAA claimed that
"customary" income, if allowed, would be easily manipulated by those seeking a
loophole in the association's amateurism bylaws. However, a carefully crafted
waiver or bylaw would allow the NCAA to retain the clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports of which it is so
covetous.160
E. Injunctive Relief Was an Appropriate Remedy in this Case
In its assessment of the merits, the court iterated that injunctive relief is a
seldom-used remedy, which should be entertained in only the rarest
circumstances.1 6' Bloom presents an extraordinary circumstance for which
injunctive relief is appropriate. Conversely, the NCAA insists that a temporary
restraining order should only be issued with a court's unwavering conviction and
that Bloom's case fails to meet this standard.1 62 In its denial for injunctive relief,
the court gives short shrift to Bloom's contention that the NCAA's ruling on his
waiver request regarding endorsements was handled arbitrarily and capriciously,
citing the fact that the NCAA had asked Bloom for further documentation
regarding his request as evidence that it had adequately considered the matter.
63
However, the NCAA's answer to Bloom's request for waiver reads like a form
letter, with no apparent consideration for the unprecedented situation that it was
asked to review.164
The memo states that "[t]he subcommittee believes its responsibility of
setting aside the normal application of NCAA legislation in certain situations is a
serious one and reminds the membership that extraordinary circumstances must be
present to warrant relief from the normal application of the legislation in
question. ,1 65 Based on its own stated criteria, the NCAA denied that a situation in
which a student-athlete who happens to be an Olympic athlete in another sport
159. Id.
160. See id. at 7; text accompanying supra n. 40.
161. Bloom, slip op. at 2 (citing Snyder, 705 P.2d at 514).
162. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 13, Bloom, 02 CV
1249.
163. Bloom, slip op. at 6.
164. See Memo. from Laura M. Wurtz, Admin. Rev. Subcomm. Coord., NCAA, to Dir. of Athletics,
Faculty Athletics Rep., Senior Woman Adminstr., and Conf. Commr., Administrative Review
Subcommittee Waiver (Mar. 21, 2002) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review). Conspicuously absent
from the memorandum is any reference to Bloom, the University of Colorado, a case number, or any
other unique information that would suggest it is not a form letter.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
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and also has been recognized as a modeling, acting, and broadcasting talent does
not fit the NCAA's definition of "extraordinary." By setting such a vague
standard of review under which to grant a student-athlete relief, the NCAA
effectively insulates itself from any legal redress, and the burden on the student-
athlete is only multiplied by the fact that the possibility of an administrative
remedy is miniscule at best.' 66 Additionally, the court in Bloom failed to consider
the fact that the NCAA may have made the request for more information merely
to perform veiled discovery before a legal complaint was ever filed, sensing that a
legal battle was about to ensue once it rejected the waiver and that it would once
again have to defend itself from antitrust attack.
V. THE SHERMAN ACT
Collegiate amateurism is not a moral issue. It is an economic camouflage for
monopoly practice.
Walter Byers, former NCAA Executive Director
67
A. Background
The Sherman Act mandates that "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal., 161 It is important
to note that the Sherman Act only prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade since
contracts, by their very nature, restrain trade in some way.169
Some restraints of trade are so objectionable on their face that they are
deemed per se violations of the Sherman Act.170 However, courts have
consistently held that alleged antitrust violations involving sports leagues and
associations should be subject to a "Rule of Reason" analysis due to the unique
nature of the business enterprise.1 71 "Rule of Reason analysis calls for a thorough
investigation of the industry at issue and a balancing of the arrangement's positive
166. See Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-72 ("[T]he NCAA's rules and decisions regarding the concerns
and challenges of student-athletes are entitled to considerable deference and [the] court is reluctant to
replace the NCAA subcommittee as the decision-maker on private waiver applications. See e. g.
Shelton v. NCAA, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198 (9th Cir.1976) (holding that 'it is not judicial business to tell a
voluntary athletic association how best to formulate or enforce its rules.')." (footnote omitted)); Def.'s
Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 12, Bloom, 02 CV 1249 ("[T]he
NCAA unquestionably has an interest in enforcing its regulations and preserving the amateur nature
of intercollegiate athletics" (quoting Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 85-86 (internal quotations omitted))).
167. Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 19 (quoting Hal Sears, The Moral Threat of Intercollegiate Sports, 19 J.
of Sport History 211 (1992) (quoting Walter Byers)) (internal quotations omitted). Byers was NCAA
Executive Director from 1951 to 1987. Id.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
169. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of U. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,98 (1984); see e.g. Ariz. v. Maricopa County
Med. Socy., 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982); Natl. Socy. of Prof. Engrs. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978);
Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
170. See L.A. Meml. Coliseum Commn. v. NatI. Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1984).
171. See id. at 1391-92.
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and negative effects on competition., 172 This balancing process is not applied until
the plaintiff first establishes a cause of action. 173 To establish a cause of action, a
plaintiff must prove the following elements: "(1) an agreement among two or
more persons or distinct business entities; (2) which is intended to harm or
unreasonably restrain competition; and (3) which actually causes injury to
,,174
competition.
B. Key Cases Involving the NCAA
The seminal case dealing with antitrust issues relating to intercollegiate
171athletics is NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the NCAA did not have the right to limit the
number of college football television appearances of its members.176 While Board
of Regents dealt with restraints imposed upon NCAA member schools as opposed
to restrictions placed on student-athletes, it nonetheless set the method of analysis
to be utilized in future cases involving antitrust issues and the NCAA.177 The
Court in Board of Regents determined that by placing a "ceiling" on the number
of games a school could televise, the NCAA had set an output restraint that prior
case law had held to be unreasonable.17 8 Additionally, the Court found that the
NCAA had set a "minimum aggregate price"'179 that prevented negotiations
between schools and broadcasters, thus making its action a clear horizontal
restriction on pricing.18°
The NCAA bylaws establish an agreement between the NCAA and its
member schools, which satisfies the first requirement that an agreement exist
among two or more business entities. 18' Additionally, as discussed in Board of
Regents, "[tihe NCAA is an association of schools which compete against each
other to attract ... fans and athletes."'182
While horizontal price-fixing among members of an association is usually
considered a per se violation of the antitrust laws, courts have consistently held
that a Rule of Reason analysis should apply when "certain products require
horizontal restraints, including horizontal price-fixing, in order to exist at all. ' 83
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Board of Regents found that the determining
factor in deciding to abandon a per se analysis had nothing to do with either the
172. Id. at 1391 (quoting Cascade Cabinet Co. v. W. Cabinet & Millwork Inc., 710 F.2d 1366, 1373
(9th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotations omitted).
173. Cascade Cabinet Co., 710 F.2d at 1373.
174. Id. (quoting Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1983))
(internal quotations omitted); see Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 290 (9th Cir. 1979).
175. 468U.S. 85.
176. Id. at 91-95, 120.
177. See id. at 100-06.
17& Id. at 99.
179. Id.
180. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S at 99-100.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
183. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017 (10th Cir. 1998).
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NCAA's non-profit status or its stature as a catalyst for higher education and
athletics.184 Instead, the court found that the NCAA involves an association of
schools that would be non-existent without some horizontal restrictions that are
necessary for its survival, thus necessitating a Rule of Reason inquiry.185 In Law v.
NCAA,' 86 the Tenth Circuit held that when the NCAA established a rule that
placed a salary cap on certain assistant coaches, thus "fix[ing] the cost of one of
the component items used by NCAA members to produce the product of Division
I basketball, 187 it constituted what would, in most circumstances, be viewed as a
per se violation of antitrust law. 118  However, the unique context of athletic
association membership beckons for Rule of Reason analysis, since the success of
the product of each member institution is at least partially dependent upon the
other institutions maintaining a certain level of success.""
In Law, the court also recognized restraints that the NCAA may permissibly
impose on its membership, with the important caveat that they be necessary for
the product to exist.' 9° The court also made clear in Law that the NCAA's
attempt to use a "joint venture" defense to escape antitrust liability is futile, since
the NCAA is not responsible for hiring coaches (the schools hire coaches
independently).19' Bloom was recruited by CU, not the NCAA, so any antitrust
violation flowing from Bloom's relationship with CU and the NCAA would pass
muster under a joint venture defense.
C. Recent Antitrust Decision
A recent case analyzing analogous considerations is TFWS, Inc. v.
Schaefer, 92 which involved a liquor store owner who sued the state comptroller for
implementing a mandatory pricing scheme upon wholesalers. 93 The court
considered the unique context of the situation in which the plaintiff was using
antitrust laws to challenge the state regulations responsible for wholesale liquor
pricing.' 94 To decide whether the state regulation should be preempted by
antitrust law, the court found the decisive inquiry to be "whether there exists an
184. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-01.
185. Id. at 101.
186. 134 F.3d 1010.
187. Id. at 1017.
188. Id.
189. Ray Yasser, Lecture, Antitrust in Professional Sports (Tulsa, Okla., Sept. 10, 2002).
190. Law, 134 F.3d at 1018.
191. Id. at 1018-19.
192. 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001), vacated on other grounds, 325 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2003). The Fourth
Circuit subsequently ruled that it was inappropriate for the trial court to grant summary judgment based on
unresolved factual determinations, which were necessary to apply the ultimate balancing test between the
state's interest to promote temperance and the federal antitrust laws. TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 325 F.3d 234 (4th
Cir. 2003).
193. TFWS, 242 F.3d at 201-02; see William C. Holmes, Antitrust Law Handbook § 1:1, 2 (2002 ed.,
West 2001).
194. Holmes, supra n. 193, at § 1:1, 2.
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irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state regulatory schemes."' 95 The
court also cited from Rice v. Norman Williams Co. 1 96 that "[a] state regulatory
scheme, when challenged on its face, 'may be condemned under the antitrust
laws... if it places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws
in order to comply with the statute."" 97  Analogously, a private association's
constitution should be preempted by the antitrust laws, because in this case,
"irresistible pressure" is placed on CU not only to abide by the bylaws, but also to
not even challenge the bylaws, since allowing Bloom to compete before he
relinquishes his acting and modeling opportunities would cause the school to
forfeit television revenue, team victories, and individual awards.1
98
D. Antitrust Implications in Bloom's Case: Applying the Rule of Reason
The NCAA is in violation of the Sherman Act by conspiring with member
schools such as CU to produce horizontal restrictions upon its member student-
athletes in regards to outside endorsement opportunities, which inures to the
benefit of the NCAA in its endorsement arrangements with companies such as
Nike, ABC, and CBS.' 99 In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court held in part that
if a sports association's rules provide for a level playing field among participants, a
valid restraint upon competition exists.'0° However, a Rule of Reason analysis
leads to the conclusion that Bloom will prevail on an antitrust claim. Although
the NCAA's pro-competitive rationale is afforded certain deference by the courts,
"it is nevertheless well settled that good motives will not validate an otherwise
anticompetitive practice."' '
On its website, the NCAA illustrates how highly the odds are stacked against
a high school football player hoping to play in the National Football League. 2m,
Only 300 out of the estimated 971,000 high school football players who hit the
gridiron each year will ever play in the NFL.2 3 The NCAA argues that Bloom's
claim-that his contract rights were unlawfully restrained by its actions-should
fail because, among other reasons, the "NCAA rules merely present [Bloom] with
195. TFWS, 242 F.3d at 207 (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982))
(internal quotations omitted); see Holmes, supra n. 193, at § 1:1, 3.
196. 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
197. TFWS, 242 F.3d at 207 (quoting Rice, 458 U.S. at 661) (emphasis added) (internal quotations
omitted); see Holmes, supra n. 193, at § 1:1, 3.
198. See NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 19.8, 319.
199. See e.g. Aff. of Andrew Carroll at T 14, Bloom, 02 CV 1249.
200. See 468 U.S. at 102. The court listed among the valid restraints that "athletes must not be paid"
or else the integrity of the product would suffer. Id. Because athlete compensation was not an issue in
this case, it should not be assumed that the Court had any inkling of the facts that would surface in
Bloom. More likely, the court was referring to direct compensation to athletes for participating in
football or basketball at a given school.
201. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 n. 23 (citing U.S. v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1948);
Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 16 n.15 (1945); Bd. of Trade of City of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238; Stand.
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912); U.S. v. Trans-Mo. Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 342
(1897)).
202. NCAA, What Does It Take to Make to the NFL <http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/
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an option to pursue intercollegiate sports as an amateur and do not bar him from
pursuing other contracts." 2°4 However, those fortunate and talented enough to
play the sport at its highest level almost always played collegiately, 205 and
therefore those who hope for a chance at the NFL are compelled into service
under the umbrella of the NCAA.2°  It is also important to note that college
football is unique as compared to baseball and basketball in that football players
have no legitimate option to showcase their skills after graduating from high
school other than playing collegiately. Only a handful of current players on NFL
rosters did not attend an NCAA-affiliated college or university. °7 The NBA has
routinely drafted high school graduate basketball players in recent years,20 8 and
even those who opt to go pro and are not selected by an NBA team may end up
playing in the NBA Developmental League, Continental Basketball Association,
or go overseas to compete professionally.2 9 Similarly, high school baseball players
are drafted by the hundreds each year by Major League Baseball franchises.210
Due to the physical demands of professional football, few, if any, eighteen-year-
olds are ready for such an experience. The NCAA therefore enjoys a virtual
monopoly over eighteen- through twenty-one-year-old football players, to be
exploited at its whim.
The court in Bloom would be best served to follow the guidance established
211in Matthews v. NCAA, where the court found that Title III of the ADA applied
to the NCAA, thus allowing federal law to trump the private association's
eligibility rules.212 Similarly, antitrust law should prevail over eligibility bylaws
when student-athletes' access to the football field is unfairly restricted through the
NCAA's use of anticompetitive financial restraints. The NCAA's interference
with a football player's contractual rights such as Bloom's is not only a hindrance
in the present, but also has the potential to unnecessarily restrain future financial
204. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 24, Bloom, 02 CV
1249.
205. See text accompanying infra n. 206.
206. See generally CBS Sportsline, NFL <http://www.sportsline.com/nfl/teams> (accessed Oct. 27,
2003) (providing access to 2003 NFL rosters listing colleges attended).
207. See id.
208. See NBA Media Ventures, LLC, NBA Draft NY02, 2001 NBA Draft, First Round
<http://www.nba.com/draft2002/history/history-01draft.html> (accessed Nov. 3, 2003). Four of the top
eight picks in the 2001 NBA draft were high school seniors, and the ninth pick in the 2002 draft was
also a high school senior. Id.; NBA Media Ventures, LLC, NBA Draft NY02, NBA Draft Board,
Round 1 <http://www.nba.com/draft2002/board/index.html> (accessed Jan. 6, 2004). Most recently, in
the 2003 NBA draft, four high school seniors were taken in the first round, including the number one
pick overall. NBA Media Ventures, LLC, NBA Draft NY03, Draft Board <http://www.nba.
com/draft2003/board.html> (accessed Jan. 6, 2004).
209. See Eurobasket, CBA Draft <http://www.usbasket.com/cba/draft02.asp> (accessed Oct. 27,
2003).
210. See ESPN.com, Baseball, Draft List: Round One <http://espn.go.com/mlb/s/2002/
060411390623.html> (accessed Jan. 6, 2004). Seven of the top eight picks in the 2002 MLB draft were
high school seniors. Tom Singer, MLB.com, High Hopes for High Schoolers <http://mlb.mlb.
com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/mlb-news.jsp?ymd=20020604&content-id=42104&vkey=news-mlb&fext
=.jsp> (accessed Nov. 16, 2002).
211. 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
212. Id. at 1220-23.
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opportunities. Renowned economist Gary Becker observed that "[an association
of companies that limits payments to employees and punishes violators would
usually be considered a labor cartel. Why should the restrictions on competition
for athletes among ... the members of the NCAA be any different?" '213
Much more difficult is the task of proving that the bylaws intend to
unreasonably restrain competition. Courts have commonly held that a
presumption exists that the NCAA bylaws are intended to further the goals of
amateurism and create a level playing field on which all member schools may
214compete. While the NCAA claims that it does not object to Bloom receiving
remuneration for the use of his name or picture by Tommy Hilfiger, 215 its
conditional approval can be quickly withdrawn or negated by other bylaws
216restricting such opportunities in a different manner. The opacity of its bylaws
forces member institutions to make uncertain determinations that could have
disastrous impacts on the student-athlete's eligibility and potentially have similarly
harsh consequences on the school's finances and athletic legacy.217 A close look at
some of the bylaws relevant to Bloom's case reveals language that is difficult to
decipher due to ambiguities drafted by the NCAA. For example, NCAA bylaw
12.5.1.3 states:
If an individual accepts remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name or
picture to advertise or promote the sale or use of a commercial product or service
prior to enrollment in a member institution, continued remuneration for the use of
the individual's name or picture (under the same or similar circumstances) after
enrollment is permitted without jeopardizing his or her eligibility to participate in
intercollegiate athletics only if all of the following conditions apply:
(a) The individual's involvement in this type of activity was initiated prior to his or
her enrollment in a member institution;
(b) The individual became involved in such activities for reasons independent of
athletics ability;
(c) No reference is made in these activities to the individual's name or involvement
in intercollegiate athletics;
(d) The individual does not endorse the commercial product;
(e) Any compensation received by the individual is consistent with applicable
limitations on a student-athlete's maximum amount of financial aid; and
(f) The individual's remuneration under such circumstances is at a rate
commensurate with the individual's skills and experience as a model or
performer and is not based in any way upon the individual's athletics ability or
reputation.
213. See Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 20 (quoting Gary Becker, College Athletes Should Get Paid what
They're Worth, Bus. Week 18 (Sept. 30, 1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
214. See e.g. Cole, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1071; Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 85-86.
215. See Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 4, Bloom, 02
CV 1249.
216. See infra n. 228 and accompanying text.
217. See infra n. 253.
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Unfortunately, courts have left the NCAA with the discretion to decipher its
own bylaws, at the expense of the student-athletes whom the regulations are
supposedly designed to protect. A brief analysis of NCAA bylaw 12.5.1.3 clearly
shows that the court should find that Bloom must be allowed to continue to
participate in and be fairly compensated for his preexisting opportunities.
Bloom clearly satisfies subsections (a) and (c), and also fulfills the
requirement of subsection (b) for endorsement opportunities, as long as the
endorsements are not solely related to his athletic ability. 29 Interpretation of the
word "independent" is determinative in establishing the meaning of subsection
(b). A liberal interpretation by the court could indicate that "independent"
reasons should be construed as those other than athletic ability, rather than
exclusive of athletic ability. Additionally, the bylaw should be interpreted to refer
to "athletic ability" as the athletic ability for which the athlete competes
collegiately, not the ability necessary to perform as a professional skier. Bloom's
skiing ability has nothing to do with the NCAA's guidelines, because he does not
compete collegiately as a skier. The language of the bylaw should be construed
against the drafter, who had the opportunity to clarify its intent when producing
the legislation, 220 but instead crafted the "conundrum" that exists today.22  The
court should have ruled that the bylaw was to be construed to require a reason not
relating to the athletic ability necessary to compete as a college football player,
"since an interpretation of a contract against a party who prepared the instrument
is preferred where different interpretations are possible or where ambiguities are
present.''222 Because "athletic ability" could be determined to include components
such as coordination, strength, agility, speed, lateral movement, muscular
endurance, and balance, some limitation must be placed on how the term is
construed. Otherwise, due to the tremendous overlap of "athletic ability" among
22324
various sports, even those as dissimilar as football and skiing,224 the term
becomes excessively restrictive. Furthermore, the NCAA's director of
membership services, Steve Mallonee, admits that the endorsement provision is
the lone amateurism provision applied to the student-athlete in his professional
sport, which distinguishes the bylaw from the other amateurism rules that are
218. See e.g. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 83 ("In general, the members of such associations should be
allowed to 'paddle their own canoe' without unwarranted interference from the courts.").
219. See generally NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.5.1.3, 79; supra nn. 12, 63, 75 and accompanying text.
220. See e.g. Jones Assocs. v. Eastside Props., Inc., 704 P.2d 681, 685 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1985)
("[A]mbiguous contract language is strictly construed against the drafter.").
221. Pl.'s Opening Br. at 12, Bloom, 02 CA 2302.
222 Ethyl Corp. v. Forcum-Lannom Assocs., 433 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. App. 4th Dist. 1982)
(quoting trial court's conclusions of law) (internal quotations omitted).
223. Bill Foran, Human Kinetics Excerpt for September!, 3-D Balance and Core Stability From High-
Performance Sports Conditioning <http://www.connectedcoach.com/html/NewsDetail.asp?ID=63>
(accessed Feb. 2, 2004).
224. Id. "Dynamic balance" is an essential ability to succeed in both football and skiing. While
skiers depend heavily on controlling their center of gravity and balance, football players must sustain
balance "while moving in relation to a moving object." Id.
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applied on a "sport specific" basis to the sport in which the student-athlete
competes collegiately.2 5
Prior to the August 2003 revision, 6 which rescinded the $2,000 cap on
employment income during the school year, it mattered little whether Bloom's
employment was related to athletic ability, since he would likely exceed the cap
from one modeling engagement, television appearance, or endorsement deal.227
Now that the $2,000 cap has been abolished, the NCAA's purportedly permissive
stance has become a gratuitous attempt to allow Bloom the opportunity to
continue these activities, because in reality the rule swallows any opportunity that
exists.228 The "related to athletic ability" issue is now the stumbling block that
prohibits Bloom from earning unlimited income from modeling, acting, and
endorsement opportunities.
Particularly vague is the requirement in subsection (d) that "[t]he individual
does not endorse the commercial product., 229 This restriction would obviously
preclude Bloom from any public appearances or autograph sessions. Less clear is
how his appearance in a picture modeling the Tommy Hilfiger brand name would
be viewed. Although the NCAA claims that the picture would not constitute an
endorsement, it is hard to imagine how modeling photographs are any less of an
expression of endorsement of a product than is making a personal appearance on
behalf of the clothier. 230 The rule simply does not clarify how one could possibly
model a product, yet not endorse it. The NCAA only states that the rate of pay
given to such athlete should not be based in any way upon the individual's
athletics ability or reputation, thus pay must be given exclusive of any
consideration of athletic ability or reputation as an athlete.23'
225. Pl.'s Opening Br. at 10, Bloom v. NCAA, 02 CA 2302.
226. Email from James Bandy, Asst. Dir. of Member Svcs., NCAA, to David Warta, Student, U.
Tulsa, RE: NCAA Information (Jan. 29, 2004) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review) (quoting from the
1998-1999 NCAA manual noting that a student-athlete could "receive earnings from legitimate on- or
off-campus employment during semester or term time in combination with other financial aid included
in the student-athlete's individual financial aid limit up to the value of a full grant plus $2,000 .... )
227. See e.g. B.G. Brooks, RockyMountainNews.com, Bloom to Challenge NCAA, Play Football
<http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/cu/article/0,1299,DRMN-2938-2589241,00.html> (Jan. 20,
2004) ("[Bloom] won $45,000 in a television Superstars competition-money he couldn't accept.") As
if his all-American image needed a further boost, Bloom planned to donate the money to his
hometown in order to help build a Little League baseball field. Mt. Sports Media, Skiingmag.com,
Bloom Wins Superstars in Jamaica <http://www.skiingmag.com/skiing/competition/article/
0,12910,453069,00.html> (accessed Feb. 3, 2004).
228. See Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 26.
229. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.5.1.3(d), 79. "Endorse" is defined by Webster's as "to express
approval of publicly and definitely." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 411 (9th ed., Merriam-
Webster 1991).
230. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 8, Bloom, 02 CV
1249.
231. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.5.1.3(f), 79.
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E. The NCAA's Memo in Opposition to Bloom's Request for Mandatory
Injunctive Relief Misinterprets Holdings from Other Courts
The NCAA defends its action against antitrust attack by citing Justice v.
23NCAA, 32 in which four Division I football players attempted to enjoin the NCAA
from prohibiting their university from participating in a post-season bowl game
due to infraction sanctions.2 The NCAA asserts the court rejected the claim due
to its finding that the penalties were imposed out of "the NCAA's concern for the
protection of amateurism. '234 Conspicuously absent from the NCAA's brief is the
analysis utilized by the court in reaching its decision, which undoubtedly
distinguishes it from the circumstances present in Bloom's case.235 The student-
athletes in Justice claimed that they were being limited in their ability to procure
professional contracts and bonuses due to the NCAA's sanctions that prohibited
their university from participating in post-season bowl competition. The court's
rationale for rejecting the claims rested on the simple fact that "[w]hat is at issue
here is not.., revocation of the plaintiffs' scholarships, or even participation in
intercollegiate athletics, but rather the significantly less substantial and speculative
opportunity to play in televised or post-season games."2 36 Bloom's case determines
whether or not he will ever have a legitimate chance at an NFL career, since his
chance of playing professionally without college experience is an extreme long
shot.237 Additionally, Bloom's Olympic window of opportunity is quickly closing,
and without endorsement income he will be at a competitive disadvantage on the
238
slopes. 8 Being denied the opportunity to participate in one game during the
course of a four-year career, as were the plaintiffs in Justice, pales in comparison
to the consequences Bloom faces by choosing to continue his preexisting
endorsement and employment opportunities.
F. Anti-Competitive Effect
In Board of Regents, the Court noted that the NCAA's practices left little
doubt that it was impeding its members' ability to negotiate their own television
contracts.239 The Court held that the NCAA actions restrained trade, stating:
There can be no doubt that the challenged practices of the NCAA constitute a
"restraint of trade" in the sense that they limit members' freedom to negotiate and
232. 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
233. Id. at 360.
234. Def.'s Memo. in Opposition to Pl.'s Req. for Mandatory Injunctive Relief at 24, Bloom, 02 CV
1249 (quoting Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383) (internal quotations omitted).
235. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 364-68.
236. Id. at 365 n. 6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
237. See supra n. 203 and accompanying text.
238. See Brooks, supra n. 227. Bloom insists that he needs a minimum of $75,000 from
endorsements, which would be used to cover travel expenses and salaries for a coach, trainer, and
nutritionist. All are necessary expenses due to the evolution of the sport. Id.
239. 468 U.S. at 106 n. 30 (noting that "[tihe anticompetitive consequences of this arrangement are
apparent"). The district court insisted that the "NCAA ha[d] commandeered the rights of its members
and sold those rights for a sum certain. In so doing, it ... fixed the minimum, maximum and actual
price which will be paid to the schools .. I." Id
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enter into their own television contracts. In that sense, however, every contract is a
restraint of trade, and as we have repeatedly recognized, the Sherman Act was
intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade.
240
In determining what would make a restraint unreasonable, the Supreme
Court observed the district court's considerations:
Like all other cartels, NCAA members have sought and achieved a price for their
product which is, in most instances, artificially high. The NCAA cartel imposes
production limits on its members, and maintains mechanisms for punishing cartel
members who seek to stray from these production quotas. The cartel has
established a uniform price for the products of each of the member producers, with
no regard for the differing quality of these products or the consumer demand for
these various products.
241
The NCAA's treatment of member institutions in such a manner is felt
similarly by constituent student-athletes. The uniform price is set for each student
as the cost of education, without any recognition for the revenue generated by an
242individual athlete. Moreover, the NCAA has found a way to calculate into the
equation skills acquired and utilized by the athlete, which are distinct from those
for which the scholarship provides assistance.
At the core of the NCAA's concern is the use of its brand name in any
fashion to the financial benefit of another.2 43 In one of its bylaws, the NCAA
specifically prohibits student-athletes from using an "individual performance" for
a commercial venture, even when the performance is unrelated to the sport in
which the athlete competes collegiately.2 4 Ironically, however, the shoe does not
seem to fit the other foot. In a recent college football telecast involving CU and
spotlighting Bloom's performance, a segment of the telecast was spent explaining
the similarity in movements required of a moguls skier and punt returner.
245
Bloom is shown on a split screen-on one side returning a punt, on the other
skiing in the World Championships. 246 While the fact that Bloom is prohibited
from ever using his college football affiliation as a tool to reap endorsement
opportunities is of paramount concern to the NCAA, it apparently finds no such
restriction applicable when using footage of Bloom skiing during one of its own
240. Id. at 98 (footnote omitted).
241. Id. at 96 (quoting Bd. of Regents of U. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1300-01 (W.D.
Okla. 1982)) (internal quotations omitted).
242 See generally Interview by Larry Conley, ESPN College Basketball Analyst, with Kirk Hinrich,
Preseason All-American Guard for the University of Kansas (Nov. 19, 2002). When asked if he could
change one thing about the NCAA, Hinrich answered that student-athletes should get a piece of the
huge financial pie that they produce on their respective school's behalf. Id.
243. See generally CBS Sportsline, News, Name of the Game: Leagues Protecting Logos, Trademarks
<http://cbs.sportsline.com/general/story/5723572> (accessed Oct. 27, 2003). The NCAA even goes so
far as to employ "private police forces" to monitor sales activity outside major events such as the Final
Four to ensure that only officially licensed NCAA merchandise is sold to protect its $2.5 billion
interest. Id.
244. Verified Mot. for T.R.O. & Prelim. lnj. at 11, Bloom, 02 CV 1249; see NCAA, supra n. 7, at §
12.5.2.3.4, 81.
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college football telecasts. 2 7 Board of Regents elucidates that an unreasonable
restraint of trade may be "based ... on the nature or character of the contracts,
or... on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption
that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices., 24 8 Bloom's agent
made considerable efforts to obtain a sponsorship deal with Nike, but when the
multi-national conglomerate became aware that Bloom was playing football at
CU, it immediately ceased interest in signing Bloom since he would be required to
wear Nike gear anyway as part of its exclusive arrangement with CU.249 It
becomes difficult to take seriously the provision in the NCAA Constitution that
proclaims: "student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional
and commercial enterprises." 250 Unfortunately, that from whom the student-
athlete need be protected most from exploitation is the NCAA itself.
The anticompetitive effect of the NCAA's restrictions on Bloom's
preexisting economic opportunities are clear in light of the relevant standard:
Anticompetitive effect is established, even without a determination of the relevant
market, where the plaintiff shows that a horizontal agreement to fix prices exists,
that the agreement is effective, and that the price set by such an agreement is more
247. Meanwhile, the NCAA and ABC both reap the financial rewards. ABC, who owns the
broadcast rights to the Bowl Championship Series (the NCAA's attempt at determining a national
champion in college football), also owns the broadcast rights for the footage on which Bloom appeared
during his victory at the World Championships. See Jasen R. Corns, Student Author, Pigskin Paydirt:
The Thriving of College Football's Bowl Championship Series in the Face of Antitrust Law, 39 Tulsa L.
Rev. 167, 174-75 (2003) (noting that ABC owns the rights to televise the Bowl Championship Series);
Family Education Network, Inc., The Rights Stuff <http://www.infoplease.com/ipsa/A0884464.html>
(accessed Aug. 31, 2003); USSA News Desk, SkiingMag.com, Competition: Freestyle Championships
Head West <http://www.skiingmag.com/skiing/competition/article/0,12910,323282.00.html> (Sept. 19,
2001) (noting that the 2002 championships to be held March 22-24, 2002, would be televised by ESPN,
a sister network of ABC).
248. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103 (quoting Natl. Socy. of Prof. Engrs., 435 U.S. at 690) (internal
quotations omitted).
249. Aff. of Andrew Carroll at 14, Bloom, 02 CV 1249. William C. Friday, former president of the
University of North Carolina System, had this to say about a system that has somehow been able to
leave its producers on the sidelines when it comes to compensation:
What looked like a game and a way to teach sportsmanship has become something else....
Television has a magnificent thing here. They don't have to train actors; they don't have to
pay the athlete .... They just turn on their cameras and there it is.
I don't think the NCAA can handle it any longer because they make too much money for
themselves .... It's the power of the dollar that no college administration has yet devised a
way of controlling.
NCAA, The NCAA News, News and Features, Thoughts of the Day <http://ncaa.org/news/1999/
19991206/active/3625n34.html> (accessed Oct. 27, 2003) (quoting Mr. Friday) (internal quotations
omitted). Ironically, the man considered to be the founder of Nike's recruiting and endorsement
division, Sonny Vaccaro, is also leery of the current state of affairs between the NCAA and corporate
sponsors. "Yes, I fear for where this is going. If corporate America keeps involving itself with amateur
athletics, if we keep allowing companies to own the schools, then you're going to be in trouble."
Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 125 (quoting Mr. Vaccaro) (internal quotations omitted). While Vaccaro was
likely more concerned about shady dealings among rival shoe companies and coaches, his quote still
serves as foreshadowing of the dilemma now facing the NCAA in dealing with Jeremy Bloom.
250. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 2.9, 5.
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favorable to the defendant than otherwise would have resulted from the operation
of market forces.25'
First, the NCAA's agreement fixed the price of endorsement dollars for athletes
at zero. 2  Second, the agreement is effective in that harsh penalties are imposed
by the NCAA against member schools when an ineligible student-athlete initiates
a legal challenge that is not ultimately resolved in the student-athlete's favor.253
Finally, market forces have already indicated that Bloom would have received far
more from his endorsement deals with companies such as Oakley, Under Armour,
and Tommy Hilfiger than the non-existent remuneration he receives from the
254NCAA. The NCAA and CU benefit from the restriction in that they reap all
financial benefit from any recognition of Bloom due to his status as an Olympic
skier and model, because they control his endorsement opportunities as a student-
athlete, whether related to his status as a student-athlete or not.
251. Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (citing Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70
Tul. L. Rev. 2631, 2636-39 (1996)).
252. See NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.5.2.1, 81.
253. See NCAA, supra n. 42, at §19.7, 340-41; supra n. 110 and accompanying text. A laundry list of
penalties awaits the NCAA member school that defies the eligibility bylaws in the errant hope of a
legal victory by the offending student-athlete. The NCAA may take one or more of the following
actions:
(a) Require that individual records and performances achieved during participation by such
ineligible student-athlete shall be vacated or stricken;
(b) Require that team records and performances achieved during participation by such
ineligible student-athlete shall be vacated or stricken;
(c) Require that team victories achieved during participation by such ineligible student-
athlete shall be abrogated and the games or events forfeited to the opposing institutions;
(d) Require that individual awards earned during participation by such ineligible student-
athlete shall be returned to the Association, the sponsor or the competing institution
supplying same;
(e) Require that team awards earned during participation by such ineligible student-athlete
shall be returned to the Association, the sponsor or the competing institution supplying
same;
(f) Determine that the institution is ineligible for one or more NCAA championships in the
sports and in the seasons in which such ineligible student-athlete participated;
(g) Determine that the institution is ineligible for invitational and postseason meets and
tournaments in the sports and in the seasons in which such ineligible student-athlete
participated;
(h) Require that the institution shall remit to the NCAA the institution's share of television
receipts (other than the portion shared with other conference members) for appearing
on any live television series or program if such ineligible student-athlete participates in
the contest(s) selected for such telecast, or if the Management Council concludes that
the institution would not have been selected for such telecast but for the participation of
such ineligible student-athlete during the season of the telecast; any such funds thus
remitted shall be devoted to the NCAA postgraduate scholarship program; and
(i) Require that the institution that has been represented in an NCAA championship by
such a student-athlete shall be a assessed a financial penalty as determined by the
Committee on Infractions.
NCAA, supra n. 42, at § 19.7, 340-41.
254. See Brooks, supra n. 227 (noting that Bloom's representatives estimate his endorsement income
could "climb into the high six figures" should he choose to accept it); text accompanying supra n. 12.
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VI. BLOOM'S CASE CALLS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE NCAA BYLAWS
The college community needs to get off its high horse and deal with these things.
Athletes ought to be allowed to test the water (in professional sports). We're just flat
wrong to not let these kids give it a whirl.
Ferdinand A. Geiger, Athletic Director, Ohio State University
2 5
The final element that Bloom must prove in order to succeed on an antitrust
claim is that the NCAA could have achieved its objectives in a substantially less
restrictive manner. 256  This requirement is best argued by pointing to simple
revisions that the NCAA could have made to its bylaws once Bloom's waiver
request was offered. Amendments should be made to NCAA bylaws to allow
flexibility for unique circumstances such as those present in Bloom's case. While
the NCAA would have the court believe that amending its constitution is an
onerous task,257 all that is onerous about amending the constitution is the process
required by the NCAA to effect such a change.2 58 First, proposed legislation must
be presented to the NCAA by a member institution or an entity affiliated with the
NCAA, such as a conference. 259 An individual student-athlete has no power to
unilaterally propose legislation to the NCAA. 260 The Alabama Supreme Court
opined as much, stating:
In such cases the athlete himself is not even a member of the athletic
association .... The athlete himself has no voice or bargaining power concerning
the rules and regulations adopted by the athletic associations because he is not a
member, yet he stands to be substantially affected, and even damaged, by an
association ruling declaring him to be ineligible to participate in intercollegiate
261
athletics.
Next, the NCAA membership services staff drafts the proposed legislation
for presentation to the Management Council or Board of Directors, and at least
262
one member of either group must sponsor the amendment. The Management
Council then has an opportunity to review the proposal-which it can delegate to
a sub-committee-kill the proposal on its own accord, or concur with the
255. NCAA, The NCAA News, Thoughts of the Day <http://ncaa.org/news/1999/19991220/active/
3626n26.html> (accessed Oct. 31, 2002) (quoting Ferdinand A. Geiger, Athletic Dir., Ohio St. U.,
1997).
256. See Tanaka v. U. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9thCir. 2001).
257. See supra n. 146 and accompanying text.
258. See NCAA, supra n. 42, at § 5.3, 37-43.
259. Telephone Interview with James Bandy, Asst. Dir. of Membership Services, NCAA (Jan. 28,
2004).
260. Id. Similarly, the NCAA does not allow student-athletes to "draft the waiver request,.. .decide
what it says,.., decide what materials to submit in support of the application,... [or] present their
own cases with their own advocates [at a hearing]." PI.'s Opening Br. at 14-15, Bloom, 02 CA 2302.
261. Pl.'s Opening Br. at 32, Bloom, 02 CA 2302 (quoting GulfSts. Conf. v. Boyd, 369 So.2d 553, 557
(Ala. 1979)) (internal quotations omitted).
262. Telephone Interview, supra n. 259. The Management Council is comprised of forty-nine
athletics administrators, including athletics directors, conference administrators, and faculty athletics
representatives. See NCAA, supra n. 42, at § 4.5.1, 26. The Board of Directors consists of eighteen
chief executive officers of member schools. Id. at § 4.2.1, 23.
20031
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decision.16' A concurrence by the Management Council is followed by
consideration of the Board of Directors, who also has the ability to kill the bill
without regard to the will of the membership.264 The Board can then adopt the
legislation by majority vote, kill the proposal, or suggest revisions. 265
Division I members may not enact legislation through a member vote.266
Amazingly, Division II and III members are allowed to pass bylaws through the
one school, one vote system.26' The only method through which Division I
membership may initiate legislation is through an override process, which requires
a minimum of thirty written requests by member schools in order to trigger a
division-wide vote.2 68 If the written request requirement is met, five-eighths of the
voting membership must also support an override to enact the legislation.269
Once the procedural hurdles are overcome, the bylaw changes necessary to
insulate the NCAA from future antitrust implication are quite simple. These
modifications would not have the broad implications the NCAA fears because
there are so few individuals with the extraordinary combination of talent,
charisma, and appearance that Bloom possesses.270
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC), an organization with
concerns similar to those of the NCAA, recognizes the NCAA as a national
2711governing body over many different sports. Similarly, the NCAA, through its
allowance of remuneration to athletes under Operation Gold Grant, recognizes
the existence and authority of the USOC. 272
However, the leniency afforded Olympic athletes in pursuing other
professional pursuits, including those sought by Bloom, is unparalleled by the
NCAA. For example, USOC bylaws dictate:
263. Telephone Interview, supra n. 259.
264. Id.
265. Id.




269. The thirty written requests must be received within sixty days of the Board's decision to adopt a
legislative change or its failure to adopt proposed legislation. If a conference submits a request on
behalf of its members, additional procedural hurdles exist that convolute the process. See NCAA,
supra n. 42, at § 5.3.2.3.1, 38-39.
270. See supra n. 75 and accompanying text.
271. The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act § 220504(b)(3) states that it establishes its
bylaws in order to represent:
amateur sports organizations [such as the NCAAJ that conduct a national program or
regular national amateur athletic competition in 2 or more sports that are included on the
program of the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, or the Pan-American Games on a
level of proficiency appropriate for the selection of amateur athletes to represent the United
States in international amateur athletic competition ....
U.S. Olympic Comm., About Us, Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act <http://www.
usolympicteam.com/aboutus/documents/amateuract.htm> (accessed Aug. 31, 2003).
272. NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.1.1.1.4.1.2, 71. Operation Gold Grant allows student-athletes to
receive up to $25,000 for a medal-winning performance in the Olympics, and still retain amateur status
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No member of the official delegation or other person subject to the jurisdiction of
the USOC shall engage in newspaper, magazine, radio or television work for
remuneration during the interval between selection and return of the Team, or shall
appear as a guest or participant on radio or television programs for remuneration,
without the permission of the Chief Executive Officer, or his/her designee.
273
While at first glance the USOC bylaws appear equally restrictive as
compared to the NCAA's, it is important to note an essential distinction. The
USOC allows athletes to engage in radio, television, and print media work for
compensation between Olympiads as long as it falls within the window running
from completion of the prior Olympiad to the selection of the next Olympic
team. 74 Therefore, an athlete who competed in the 2002 Winter Olympics is free
to pursue those opportunities for pay and still retain eligibility for the 2006 Winter
Olympics as long as the individual ceases those activities for the much smaller
window of time running from team selection until the final day of competition.275
The USOC is succinct in its rationale for abandoning a narrow line view regarding
the principles of amateurism: "We wanted to rid ourselves of the hypocrisy.,
276
The NCAA could impose a similar requirement upon its athletes, which in
Bloom's case would require him to desist from modeling, acting, and broadcasting
for pay during the NCAA football season, which would run from early August
through the BCS championship game in early January. Outside that window,
Bloom should be allowed to pursue those opportunities as long as (1) he does not
associate himself with CU or college football while performing those professional
opportunities, and (2) he receives compensation that is commensurate for one of
277his talent and experience. In allowing Bloom to do so, the NCAA would bring
its version of amateurism in closer harmony with the USOC guidelines and would
encourage the most gifted student-athletes to maximize their special talents.
Another simple, yet effective change should be made to NCAA bylaw
12.5.1.3(b), which weighs toward allowing promotional activities if "[t]he
individual became involved in such activities for reasons independent of athletics
ability., 278 A more appropriate version would allow promotional activities if the
individual became involved in such activities for reasons independent of his or her
participation in a sport at a member institution. This would preclude the NCAA
from capitalizing on student-athletes' athletic ability for sports in which they
participate outside of the NCAA's authority. Even NCAA President Myles
Brand now admits that promotional activities and endorsements "are of significant
interest to student-athletes 2 79 and that while endorsements should not be




276. Zimbalist, supra n. 1, at 20 (quoting Goldie Blumenstyk, NCAA Director Says Colleges Should
Rethink Rules of Amateurism, Chron. of Higher Educ. A31 (June 21, 1996) (quoting Mike Moran,
USOC Dir. of Pub. Info.)) (internal quotations omitted).
277. See NCAA, supra n. 7, at § 12.5.1.3(f), 79.
27& Id. at § 12.5.1.3(b), 79.
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permitted at the sacrifice of the basic amateurism principles, the NCAA "need[s]
to ensure that the standard is applied fairly and supports student-athletes. "2 80
VII. CONCLUSION
The biggest problem with the current bylaws affecting Bloom is that they
were crafted to prevent those who would manipulate the system from gaining
financial advantage. But they also work to the detriment of those with legitimate
interests like Bloom's. The NCAA's real fear is that it would be opening a box of
Pandoran proportion if it provides Bloom the relief he seeks. The NCAA
envisions a world where star football players would be performing local spots for
car dealerships, fast food restaurants, and the like due only to their celebrity status
as collegiate athletes. The question the NCAA would ask is: Where do we draw
the line? In Bloom's case, the line is not in danger of becoming blurred,
specifically due to his preexisting Olympic status in another sport and his
endorsement deals in place prior to enrollment at CU. Strong public policy exists
to protect the economic benefit flowing from Olympic competition to those who
volunteer to represent our country, 281 and those rights should not be truncated due
to the athlete's interest in pursuing amateur interests in a different sport.
Through its bylaws, the NCAA has roadblocked three well-paved avenues
that Bloom worked hard to open. The NCAA has shifted Bloom's endorsement,
acting, and modeling careers to neutral while he acts as one of the thousands of
student-athlete deliverymen in the billion-dollar business of college football.
The NCAA, in dealing with its member schools and its student-athletes, such
as Bloom, would be better served by taking the course suggested in 1915 by
LeBaron R. Briggs, Dean of Harvard University and President of the NCAA:
[B]lind unbelief is sure to err. We cannot establish trust in ourselves without
trusting others. Moreover, heretical though it may seem, there are many worse
things than being cheated now and then. And if we are always expecting to be
cheated, we are not merely unhappy, we are cheated quite often. When we know
that a man or a college is untrustworthy, let us not deal with him or it, but let us be
slow in knowing. Let us not distrust until we have to-and we may never have to.
282
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2004) (available at <http://www.ncaa.org/releases/divi/2004/2004022501dl.htm>). The Management
Council accepted a proposal made by the Student Athletes Advisory Committee to review the
endorsement legislation at the NCAA's Academic, Eligibility, and Compliance Cabinet meeting in
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281. See supra n. 272 and accompanying text.
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